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MANIPULATION
GINA-GAIL S. FLETCHER †
ABSTRACT
Is manipulation possible in the absence of misconduct? This is the
foundational inquiry at the heart of open-market manipulation. Openmarket manipulation captures the attention of lawmakers and courts
because it is market manipulation effected entirely through facially
legitimate transactions. Whereas traditional, well-accepted forms of
market manipulation involve deception, fraud, and monopolistic
prices, open-market manipulation involves no objectively bad acts and,
instead, is accomplished through permissible transactions executed on
the open market. As enforcement of this form of manipulation
increases, the question arises—when, if ever, is a legitimate transaction
manipulative?
To the Securities Exchange Commission and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (“the Commissions”), the answer is
simple—legitimate transactions are manipulative if the trader intends
to manipulate the market. The Commissions’ enforcement actions are
based on the theory that the manipulative intent of the trader is
sufficient to transform otherwise legitimate transactions into openmarket manipulation. But this approach is fundamentally flawed.
Traders may be treated differently for the same conduct under this
approach, and it leaves market actors none the wiser as to when their
conduct may be considered manipulative. Indeed, the Commissions’
intent-focused approach only exacerbates the chaos that currently
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surrounds the law of market manipulation and makes enforcement
against open-market manipulation less effective.
This Article is the first in-depth analysis of the concept of openmarket manipulation, and it finds the Commissions’ approach to be
sorely lacking. While the Commissions are correct to conclude that
facially legitimate transactions may be manipulative, the intent-centric
model is untenable. Intent is an insufficient tool in identifying openmarket manipulation because it does not address the most important
aspect of open-market manipulation—how open-market transactions
harm the markets. Thus, this Article argues that courts and regulators
should, instead, coherently identify the necessary conditions under
which open-market transactions are harmful to the markets.
Specifically, this Article argues that only those open-market
transactions that impede the markets’ efficiency and undermine their
integrity should be deemed manipulative. Linking the theory of openmarket manipulation to the purpose of anti-manipulation laws would
provide the Commissions with more cogent principles on which to hold
manipulators liable for their seemingly legitimate transactions.
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INTRODUCTION
Manipulation is difficult to define . . . . [D]rawing a line between
healthy economic behavior and that which is offensive has proved to be
too subjective and imprecise to produce an effective regulatory tool.1
Traditionally, the notion of market manipulation triggers ideas of
deliberate misconduct that allows unscrupulous actors to profit at the
expense of others. Whether through false or misleading information or
through market monopolization, market manipulation commonly
evokes the image of a bad actor, oftentimes a speculator, who has
purposefully attempted to “game the market” in ways that are
injurious to the proper functioning of the markets. It is this expectation

1. Robert C. Lower, Disruptions of the Futures Market: A Comment on Dealing with Market
Manipulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 391, 392 (1991).
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of manipulation that makes the allegations of market manipulation
against Kraft Foods (“Kraft”) most perplexing.
Kraft is one of the largest consumers of wheat, using it to produce
many of its signature products—Oreos, Wheat Thins, Triscuit crackers,
and Chips Ahoy! cookies.2 As a primary consumer of a classic physical
commodity, Kraft represents the quintessential “good” actor in the
commodities market. It is not a speculator, trading for pure profit;
rather, it is an end user of wheat, and it utilizes the commodities
markets to protect itself from price fluctuations and shortages that
could significantly impact its business. Kraft is the type of market actor
for which the futures markets exist—an entity that uses the markets to
offset risk inherent to its business. Yet, in 2015, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) accused Kraft of manipulating
the wheat market.3
The allegations of manipulation arose from Kraft’s trading
strategy of taking advantage of a price discrepancy between the price
for wheat on the futures market and the physical market.4 Futures are
contracts that represent the right to buy or sell a commodity at a set
price on an agreed-upon date.5 The price of futures contracts is
connected to, but not necessarily the same as, the price of the asset on
which they are based.6 Thus, the price of wheat futures is often affected
by conditions in the physical market. In 2011, drought ruined
worldwide wheat crops, and as a result, wheat on the physical market
was at an all-time high.7 In response, Kraft purchased a six-month
2. CFTC v. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“Kraft is one
of the largest domestic users of #2 Soft Red Winter Wheat . . . . Kraft uses that wheat in the
production of snack foods, including Oreo, Ritz, Triscuit, Wheat Thins, and Chips Ahoy!”
(citation omitted)).
3. Id. at 1004 (“Plaintiff alleges that in October 2011, despite the results of its trial run, Kraft
wheat procurement staff proposed to Kraft senior management a strategy of buying $90 million
of December 2011 wheat futures in order to depress the price of cash wheat and inflate the price
of futures wheat.” (citation omitted)).
4. The physical market is also known as the cash market.
5. See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks of Hedging
with Credit Derivatives, 33 REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L. 813, 826 (2014) [hereinafter Fletcher,
Hazardous Hedging] (defining futures and other derivative instruments).
6. Scott H. Irwin & Dwight R. Sanders, The Impact of Index and Swap Funds on
Commodity Futures Markets 6–7 (OECD, Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Paper No.
27, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/trade/agricultural-trade/45534528.pdf [https://perma.cc/WX5HMNZD] (explaining that buyers of futures contracts are owners of the physical commodity, since
their “long” position is matched by real inventory, and that they can create a “short” in the
physical supply by holding their long position, increasing the price of the commodity).
7. Gary Vocke, Wheat Year in Review (Domestic): Higher Domestic Use and Exports Lower
2010/11 Ending Stocks, USDA ELEC. OUTLOOK REP. FROM THE ECON. RES. SERV. 1 (Jan. 2012),
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supply of wheat futures, which, at the time, was cheaper than physical
wheat.8 The wheat connected to the futures was not of a high enough
quality for Kraft to use in its manufacturing; nonetheless, Kraft’s $90
million purchase of wheat futures allegedly lowered the price of wheat
on the cash market.9 With the price of physical wheat reduced, Kraft
“netted out” its futures10 and avoided $5.4 million in losses.11
Was Kraft’s large purchase an act of manipulation or the conduct
of a savvy end user seeking the best price? To the CFTC, Kraft was
guilty of market manipulation because it purchased wheat futures with
the intent to manipulate the physical price of wheat downwards.12
Interestingly, Kraft’s strategy did not involve illegal transactions or
behavior typically associated with market manipulation. The CFTC did
not allege that Kraft “cornered” the market;13 nor did it allege that the

http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/ers/WHS//2010s/2012/WHS-01-24-2012.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DRE4-DVSM] (“The all-wheat season-average price (SAP) for 2010/11 was $5.70 per
bushel. This price was above . . . SAP for the preceding marketing year of $4.87, but less than the
all-time record $6.78 in 2008/09 and . . . previous record of $6.48 in 2007/08. The 2010/11 price was
higher than all years . . . [before] 2007/08.”); Lester R. Brown, The Great Food Crisis of 2011,
EARTH POL’Y INST. (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.earth-policy.org/mobile/releases/update90
[https://perma.cc/C2J8-PFZD] (“As the new year begins, the price of wheat is setting an all-time
high in the United Kingdom.”); Wheat, TRADING ECONS., https://tradingeconomics.com/
commodity/wheat [https://perma.cc/3MZV-8KYC] (“Historically, Wheat reached an all time high
of 1194.50 in February of 2008 and a record low of 192 in July of 1999.”); Wheat Prices Reaches
All Time High!, LEVERAGE ACAD. F. (Jan. 27, 2011, 9:41 PM), http://leverageacademy.com/
blog/2011/01/27/wheat-reaches-all-time-high/
[https://perma.cc/T9Y8-SYHV]
(“Algeria’s
purchase of 800,000 metric tons of milling wheat this past Wednesday pushed wheat prices to an
all time high of $8.61¼ a bushel, up 2.1%. Wheat prices have reached a record high, greater than
during the 2007-2008 food crisis.”).
8. See Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1003 (stating that “[i]n developing that
strategy, Plaintiff[] claim[s] that Kraft intended that the market would react to its enormous long
position by increasing the price of the December 2011 futures contract and lowering the price of
cash wheat available in the Toledo region.”); see also Michael Brooks et al., Did Kraft Manipulate
Futures? FUTURES MAG., (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.futuresmag.com/2015/09/29/did-kraftmanipulate-futures [https://perma.cc/P8YB-Q7HR] (noting that in 2011, physical wheat was
trading at a premium to wheat futures).
9. Complaint at 8, CFTC v. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 996 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (No.
1:15-cv-02881).
10. With futures contracts, the holder may choose to accept delivery of the commodity or
“net out” the contract by executing an equal, offsetting futures contract.
11. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d. at 1013–14.
12. Id. at 1013.
13. A corner is the process by which a trader dominates the market for a commodity and is
able to control its supply. This practice is prohibited under the Commodity Exchange Act. Id. at
1018 (discussing the definition of “corner,” and establishing that the complaint filed by the CFTC
does not allege a corner); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012)
(prohibiting market manipulation).
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transactions were fictitious.14 Indeed, all Kraft’s transactions, in both
the physical and futures markets, were legal; yet, according to the
CFTC, the company was guilty of market manipulation solely because
of its intent to manipulate.
The allegations against Kraft are an example of open-market
manipulation—manipulation accomplished through facially legitimate
transactions.15 Allegations of open-market manipulation have become
more common over the years, as the Securities Exchange Commission
(“SEC”), the CFTC (collectively, the “Commissions”), and private
plaintiffs bring suit alleging that traders manipulated the markets using
legitimate trades.16 In seeking to impose liability for open-market
manipulation, the Commissions recognize and are attempting to
address the potential distortive effect of complex trading strategies and
new financial products that hide behind a façade of legitimacy.17
However, the Commissions’ theoretical basis for liability is woefully
inadequate and does not improve the markets’ functioning.
To the Commissions, the line between legitimate and
manipulative conduct lies exclusively in the intent of the actor.
14. Fictitious trades include wash sales, order matching, and trading pools, practices in which
ownership of the commodity or security does not change hands, but the transactions are done to
give the appearance that there is trading in the commodity or security. Fictitious trades are illegal
under the Commodity Exchange Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Commodity
Exchange Act of 1936 § 6(c), 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
15. Maxwell K. Multer, Open-Market Manipulation Under SEC Rule 10b-5 and its
Analogues: Inappropriate Distinctions, Judicial Disagreement and Case Study: FERC’s AntiManipulation Rule, 39 SEC. REG. L.J. 97, 102 (2011) (“Open-market manipulations involve no
objectively fraudulent or bad acts.”). To be clear, the scope of this Article’s analysis does not
include spoofing, layering, or other algorithmic trading strategies.
16. See, e.g., ScripsAmerica, Inc. v. Ironridge Global LLC, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1134 (C.D.
Cal. 2014) (involving a plaintiff that brought suit alleging that the defendant had “fraudulently
manipulated the market for [plaintiff] Scrips stock . . . by ‘short selling’ Scrips’ shares . . . in an
effort to drive the share price down artificially and require Scrips to issue more shares to
[defendant] Ironridge pursuant to the terms of the parties’ agreement”); Burt v. Maasberg, No.
ELH-12-0464, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46732, at *72 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2013) (“[P]laintiffs allege
that ‘defendants,’ and, in particular, Blair, engaged in market manipulation . . . conceal[ing] the
group’s intentions of buying Lyris stock, to drive away other investors, and to depress the price
of Lyris stock.”); SEC v. Ogle, No. 99 C 609, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10,
2000) (explaining that the SEC alleged that the defendant acted as a statutory underwriter when
selling unregistered stock during its market manipulation scheme).
17. Matthew Evans, Note, Regulating Electricity-Market Manipulation: A Proposal for a New
Regulatory Regime to Proscribe All Forms of Manipulation, 113 MICH. L. REV. 585, 601–02 &
n.109 (2015) (highlighting that the CFTC has made it clear that conduct “giving rise to a
manipulation charge need not itself be fraudulent or otherwise illegal,” and that this allows the
CFTC to target strategies and products that feign legitimacy (quoting Prohibition on Market Price
Manipulation, 75 Fed. Reg. 67657, 67661 (Nov. 3, 2010) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180
(2014)))).
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Specifically, the Commissions treat the intent of the trader to
manipulate the markets as both necessary and sufficient to transform
otherwise legitimate transactions into manipulation.18 Private parties
alleging open-market manipulation have also adopted this approach.19
The courts, on the other hand, are less predictable in their
approaches.20 For some courts, intent alone is insufficient; these courts
are unwilling to classify open-market transactions as manipulative
without a showing of “something more.”21 The divergent approaches
18. Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial
Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 510 (1991) (“[T]here is no objective definition of manipulation.
The only definition that makes any sense is subjective—it focuses entirely on the intent of the
trader.”); Hui Huang, Redefining Market Manipulation in Australia: The Role of an Implied Intent
Element, 27 COMPANIES & SEC. L.J. 8, 12 (2009) (“‘[I]intent’ is an essential element of market
manipulation without which a transaction would not be manipulative at all.”); see, e.g., Alexander
F.H. Loke, The Investors’ Protected Interest Against Market Manipulation in the United Kingdom,
Australia and Singapore, 21 AUSTRALIAN J. CORP. L. 22, 24 (2007) (contending “that there is an
irreducible relevance of motivations” in market manipulation cases); Lawrence Damian McCabe,
Note, Puppet Masters or Marionettes: Is Program Trading Manipulative as Defined by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S207, S223 (1993) (arguing that “[t]he
presence of an improper purpose . . . is necessary to determine whether the activity should [have
been] condemned as unlawful manipulation”).
19. Compare Nanopierce Techs., Inc. v. Southridge Cap. Mgmt. LLC., No. 02 Civ.0767 LBS,
2002 WL 31819207, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) (acknowledging that the plaintiffs adequately
pled the scienter requirement by exhibiting “both the motive and the opportunity to defraud
Nanopierce” (citation omitted)), with GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 211
(3d Cir. 2001) (“Another reason why [the plaintiff’s] market manipulation claim fails is because
he has not met the scienter requirement by offering evidence that GFL engaged in short sales for
the purpose of artificially depressing the prices of National Medical and EquiMed stock.”).
20. See, e.g., GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd., 272 F.3d at 205 (explaining that market
manipulation depends on the activity rather than the intent, and noting that “[t]he gravamen of
manipulation is deception of investors into believing that prices at which they purchase and sell
securities are determined by the natural interplay of supply and demand, not rigged by
manipulators” (quoting Gurary v. Winehouse, 190 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1999)); Markowski v. SEC,
274 F.3d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“It may be hard to separate a ‘manipulative’ investor from one
who is simply over-enthusiastic . . . . Legality would thus depend entirely on whether the investor’s
intent was ‘an investment purpose’ or ‘solely to affect the price of [the] security.’” (quoting United
States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1991))); CFTC v. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., 153 F.
Supp. 3d 996, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“Intent is what separates ‘lawful business conduct from
unlawful manipulative activity.’ . . . This means that the intent to artificially affect prices can
convert otherwise legal, open-market transactions into manipulative activity.” (citations
omitted)); CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F. Supp. 2d 523, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“Although Masri dealt with the interpretation of federal securities laws, there is no doubt that
marking the close or any other trading practices, without an allegation of fraudulent conduct, can
also constitute manipulation in contravention of the CEA, so long as they are pursued with a
manipulative intent.”); SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]he Second
Circuit has explicitly declined to answer the first question presented in this case—whether
manipulative intent alone can support liability for otherwise legal open-market transactions.”).
21. See Mulheren, 938 F.2d at 371 (emphasizing that absent bad acts, the plaintiff needs to
prove manipulative intent and also “other indicia of manipulation”); In re Coll. Bound Consol.
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of the Commissions and the courts add an uncomfortable level of
unpredictability to the markets, thus muddying an already chaotic
corner of financial regulation.
Open-market manipulation and the Commissions’ current theory
of liability raise noteworthy questions that are largely unaddressed in
academic literature on market manipulation. Anti-manipulation laws
are geared toward making the markets safer and more efficient for
investors. Yet, in targeting conduct that is illegitimate solely because
of the intent of the trader, the Commissions’ approach to open-market
manipulation has arguably deviated from their statutory purposes. The
intent-centric approach of the government to open-market
manipulation is a significant departure from the traditional
conceptualization of market manipulation as conduct that is both
harmful to the markets and accompanied by bad intent. Indeed, as this
Article demonstrates, the Commissions’ intent-centric approach to
open-market manipulation lacks a coherent basis for liability and
weakens the efficacy of anti-manipulation enforcement actions.
This Article addresses the issue of open-market manipulation by
seeking to answer two foundational questions. First, can facially
legitimate transactions be manipulative (that is, improperly distort the
markets)? Second, if yes, on what basis should open-market
transactions be considered manipulative from a legal standpoint?22 As
to the first question, this Article argues that open-market transactions
can distort the markets. However, unlike the Commissions, this Article
rejects intent as the sole basis for deeming legitimate yet manipulative

Lit., Nos. 93 Civ. 2348 (MBM), 94 Civ. 3033 (MBM), 1995 WL 450486, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 31,
1995) (explaining that open-market manipulation claims have to plead the following elements:
“1) ‘profit or personal gain to the alleged manipulator’; 2) deceptive intent; 3) market domination;
and 4) economic reasonableness of the alleged manipulation” (quoting Mulheren, 938 F.2d at 370–
72)); Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk Disclosure
and Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763, 785–86 (2016) (discussing the courts’ definition of
corporate scienter as a struggle to define “that scope of knowledge in a way that syncs to investors’
reasonable expectations”).
22. This Article faces its own internal conundrum that “manipulation” (and its derivatives)
may refer to both (1) the act of distorting the market and (2) the legal claim of market
manipulation. As best as possible, this Article delineates when it uses manipulation to refer to the
act of distorting the market and when manipulation refers to an illegal act for which there is a
legally cognizable claim, recognizing that not all distortive trades are per se legal violations. Thus,
this Article uses “manipulative acts” (or something similar) to refer to trades that distort the
market as a descriptive (not legal) matter; “manipulation,” “market manipulation,” and “illegal
manipulation” (and their derivatives) are used to refer to manipulative acts that are also legal
violations of anti-manipulation laws and regulations. For a discussion of the legal definitions of
manipulation, see infra Part I.B.
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transactions illegal. Intent is a necessary component of identifying
open-market manipulation, but it is not sufficient on its own. The
Commissions’ intent-centric basis of liability ignores the most
important aspect of open-market manipulation—harm to the market.
To the extent that open-market transactions harm the markets, they
should be treated as illegal manipulation. This Article offers an
alternative legal approach to open-market manipulation that looks
both at the intent of the trader and the harm of her conduct on the
markets. This Article’s proposed approach to open-market
manipulation moves the inquiry beyond the intent of the trader to
answer the fundamental question of why some legitimate transactions
may nonetheless be wrongful. By adopting a market-harm approach to
open-market manipulation, lawmakers and the courts can begin to
develop more coherent principles for identifying and addressing this
form of market manipulation.
This Article is the first that analyzes the fundamental question of
open-market manipulation in the securities and commodities markets
from a legal standpoint. By focusing on the harm the transaction
imposes on the market, this Article demonstrates that open-market
transactions can be used to illegally manipulate the markets, and that
the legitimacy of the underlying transactions does not render the
conduct any less harmful to the markets. Instead of looking for
“something more” or for wrongful conduct in order to hold a trader
liable for open-market manipulation, lawmakers and courts should
focus on the impact of the transactions on the markets. Analyzing
open-market manipulation through its effect on the market would
empower lawmakers to ignore the red herring of the transactions’
legitimacy and would allow them to instead concentrate on the harm
of the transactions. A market-harm approach would thereby allow for
an appropriate separation of illegally manipulative conduct from
permissible transactions. To meaningfully ground liability for openmarket manipulation on harm to the market, it is necessary to define
harm. This Article defines harm with reference to the goals of antimanipulation laws and the types of manipulative conduct that these
laws target. Specifically, open-market trades can harm the markets by
(1) undermining market efficiency by creating an artificial price and (2)
impairing market integrity by creating unfair and dishonest market
conditions.
This Article proceeds in the following order. Part I details the
goals and content of anti-manipulation laws. It also defines market
manipulation from a structural standpoint, discussing the necessary
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components of manipulation. Part II introduces the concept of openmarket manipulation and, through the use of case studies, establishes
how facially legitimate transactions may nevertheless distort the
market. Notably, the case studies also demonstrate the shortcomings
of the Commissions’ intent-centric theoretical basis for open-market
manipulation. Part II concludes that intent fails to adequately capture
and deter illegal manipulation accomplished through facially
legitimate transactions. Part III asserts this Article’s thesis and primary
contribution to manipulation law and scholarship—liability for openmarket manipulation must be based on whether the transactions harm
the markets’ efficiency, integrity, or both. Part III analyzes how openmarket manipulation distorts asset prices and therefore impairs the
integrity of the market, similar to more easily identifiable forms of
illegal market manipulation. Part III also argues in favor of a new basis
of liability for open-market manipulation—whether the transaction
was unfair to counterparties because it resulted in unjust wealth
transfers, which ultimately undermine market integrity. In addition,
Part III considers what role market discipline may play in limiting the
effect of open-market manipulation on the markets. Part III outlines a
proposal to assist lawmakers in improving detection and enforcement
of open-market manipulation. Part IV discusses the benefits and
potential drawbacks of this Article’s proposal.
I. A PRIMER ON MARKET MANIPULATION
Preventing market manipulation was one of the initial motivators
behind the adoption of the securities and commodities laws. Although
the purpose of financial-market regulations and laws has since been
extended, identifying, proscribing, and punishing market manipulation
remains one of the primary goals of the Commissions in their oversight
of the financial markets. This Part discusses the overarching goals of
manipulation laws and regulation to provide a foundational
understanding of why these laws exist. Part I goes on to discuss how
market manipulation is defined both theoretically and statutorily.
A. Goals of Manipulation Laws
Market manipulation imposes significant social and financial costs
on the financial markets.23 Because of this welfare-reducing impact on

23. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41
DUKE L.J. 977, 1006–07 (1992) (explaining that inaccurate stock prices induce corporations to
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the markets, both the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange
Act”) and the Commodity Exchange Act (the “CEA”) (collectively,
“the Acts”) identify the prevention of manipulation as one of their
primary goals.24 Market manipulation undermines the fundamental
operation of the financial markets—to facilitate the efficient allocation
of capital within the markets.25 Indeed, manipulation has far-reaching
consequences beyond the capital markets; it affects investments,
consumer savings, and numerous aspects of the real economy.26
Manipulation harms the market in two related ways. First, it
undermines the market’s efficiency by distorting its pricing
mechanisms.27 Second, it impairs the market’s integrity because the
conduct can lead other market participants to believe the market is

take actions that do not maximize their utility, while accurate stock prices facilitate efficient
allocation of resources and encourage corporations to act in a manner that is socially desirable);
see also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 489, 498 (2013) (noting that under welfare economics, a general equilibrium theory
posits “that a competitive equilibrium is good for the economy because it maximizes wealth” and
that, therefore, activity that is anticompetitive or manipulative will result in suboptimal results
that are likely to be economically harmful); Craig Pirrong, Energy Market Manipulation:
Definition, Diagnosis, and Deterrence, 31 ENERGY L.J. 1, 4 (2010) (explaining that market
manipulation is socially costly since “[i]t distorts prices, and typically leads to distortions in
commodity flows”).
24. 7 U.S.C. § 6c (2012) (prohibiting manipulative strategies, such as wash sales and fictitious
sales, that aim to cause a change in the “bona fide price” of a commodity); 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(prohibiting the use of manipulative devices in connection with the sale or purchase of any
security). For example, in enacting the Exchange Act, Congress expressed its belief that
manipulation of the securities markets is the cause of “widespread unemployment and dislocation
of trade, transportation, and industry.” 15 U.S.C. § 78b. With regards to the CEA, Congress
concluded that regulation of futures trading is necessary because futures transactions are
“susceptible to manipulation and control” and may generate sudden changes in the market. Id.
25. Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 185 (2017)
(“The capital markets exist for two purposes: (i) to allocate capital to the most profitable
opportunities (on the macroeconomic level); and (ii) to help market participants invest or borrow
money (on the microeconomic level).” (citation omitted)); Zohar Goshen & Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713 (2006) (“[T]he
ultimate goal of securities regulation is to attain efficient financial markets and thereby improve
the allocation of resources in the economy.”); Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial
Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 35 (2010) (“The basic goals of the markets have remained the
same—namely, the efficient allocation, transfer, and deployment of capital resources and riskbearing.”).
26. Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung & Artyom Durnev, Law, Share Price
Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 368 (2003)
(“[T]he empirical evidence suggests that the efficiency of the real economy (the actual production
of goods and services) is enhanced when share prices become more accurate.”).
27. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 714 (“More accurate share prices and more
liquid trading enhance the efficiency of financial markets.”).
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unfair.28 Consequently, if left unchecked, manipulation can eventually
lead to the demise of the market.29
1. Market Efficiency. Efficient markets incorporate information,
accurately and quickly, into the prices of securities and commodities
(collectively, “assets”).30 Two hallmark features of market efficiency
are price accuracy and high liquidity.31 Liquidity refers to the ready
availability of other traders with whom to transact in the markets and
the ability of traders to execute transactions without significant market
movement.32 Greater liquidity increases the accuracy of the market
price for an asset; more accurate asset prices lead to greater liquidity.33
28. Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large
Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1982) (“If the public believes that the game is unfair
and chooses not to play, the markets will suffer and the efficient allocation of capital will be
impeded.”). But see Jill E. Fisch, Family Ties: Salman and the Scope of Insider Trading, 69 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 46, 46 (2016) (noting that because “federal securities laws do not prohibit all
trading on material nonpublic information,” it is clear that not all participants begin the trading
process with equal information, which may lead to unfairness).
29. Carole Comerton-Forde & James Rydge, Market Integrity and Surveillance Effort, 29 J.
FIN. SERV. RES. 149, 149 (2006) (“Market integrity refers to the ability of investors to transact in
a fair and informed market where prices reflect information.”).
30. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 721 (“In efficient markets, information about
the value of firms is incorporated quickly and accurately into stock prices.”); Lynn A. Stout, The
Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639
(2003) (“[A] market is ‘efficient’ when prices always fully reflect available information.” (citation
omitted)).
31. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 714 (“The two main determinants of market
efficiency are share price accuracy and financial liquidity.”); see also Hillary A. Sale & Robert B.
Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH U. L. REV.
487, 494 (2015) (“Market efficiency and intermediation play a role in both facilitating securities
offerings and enabling the class action that helps support the deterrence and enforcement
necessary to create strong and healthy markets.”).
32. Douglas J. Elliott, Market Liquidity: A Primer, BROOKINGS INST. 3 (June 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Market-Liquidity.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QVA9-J6QT] (explaining that liquidity emerges from ease of transactions based
on time restraints, minimal transaction costs, and presence of potential buyers willing to pay
theoretical market value); Myles Udland, The Market is Getting Nervous About Something
Experts are Struggling to Define, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 26, 2015 7:31 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/liquidity-in-the-bond-market-2015-4
[https://perma.cc/YF4HQC2K] (explaining that a liquid market is one in which trades can be executed with some
immediacy at low transaction costs).
33. NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPOULOS, THE LOGIC OF SECURITIES LAW 144 (2017)
(“Greater trading activity translates into greater liquidity directly. . . . The economic force leading
from liquidity to accurate prices rests on the reality that liquidity attracts informed trading.”);
Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Systemic Risk Through
Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1373
(2009) (“Liquidity is one very important component of any market; it insures the accurate pricing
of securities.”).
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Consequently, both accurate pricing and liquidity are essential to
efficient capital allocation in the financial markets.34
Manipulation causes market inefficiency and capital misallocation
by interfering with the pricing accuracy of the markets in two ways.
First, asset prices are made less accurate as misinformation is injected
into the markets.35 As inaccurate information is incorporated into the
price of the asset, the market price moves further away from the value
of the asset.36 False information, therefore, inhibits the ability of the
markets to efficiently price assets and impairs the markets’ functioning.
Second, manipulation may create a false appearance of liquidity in the
markets, resulting in an artificial asset price.37 A manipulator who
creates the illusion that there is more trading in an asset than there is
in actuality, is distorting the levels of liquidity to exert pressure on the
asset’s price.
Distorted pricing, accomplished through either or both
mechanisms, is detrimental to the markets’ fundamental purpose—the
efficient allocation of capital.38 Anti-manipulation laws aim to reduce
or eliminate transactions that undermine the ability of the markets to
facilitate accurate, efficient price discovery.39 When manipulation
impacts asset prices, the result is an inefficient allocation of capital,
which, in turn, harms the aggregate social welfare as wealth is
transferred from innocent investors to manipulators.40 To the extent
34. Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 39, 55–56 (2011) (explaining that banks and market makers “facilitate capital-raising by
providing investors with liquidity . . . without interrupting the end-user’s longer-term employment
of capital.”).
35. Kahan, supra note 23, at 987 (“[T]he amount and nature of the economic losses caused
by inaccurate stock prices depend critically on the kind of mispricing.”).
36. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 23, at 504 (“[T]he market price is set under conditions
of information asymmetry, and thus the market price is not fully informed.”); Steve Thel,
Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security Prices and the Text of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 398 (“Prices may change in response to
false or misleading communications since security prices reflect what investors believe, even if
those beliefs are wrong.”).
37. James Wm. Moore & Frank M. Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2
U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 50 (1934) (stating that manipulation leads to artificial and controlled prices).
38. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 730 (“The larger the deviation between
price and value and the longer it takes for prices to revert to value, the less efficient the market
is.”).
39. Id. at 713 (explaining that “the ultimate goal of securities regulation is to attain efficient
financial markets and thereby improve the allocation of resources in the economy”).
40. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 104 n.131 (2011) (“The threshold question for FOTM [fraud-onthe-market] concerns the calculation of . . . net harm. An underdiversified informed trader who
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that both the supply and demand of an asset and the information
related to the asset are distorted, market actors may direct their
resources toward assets or investments that are not accurately priced,
thereby reducing the utility of the markets to investors as a whole.41 In
determining whether conduct is manipulative, therefore, lawmakers
must consider whether it results in inefficient pricing, thereby
impairing capital allocation.
2. Market Integrity. Market integrity is a broad term that refers to
notions of market fairness, investor protection, and the absence of
misinformation and market abuse.42 The actual and perceived integrity
of the financial markets are crucial to their ability to attract capital;
investors invest only to the extent that they believe the markets are
fair.43 Should investors see the markets as unfair, honest investors
would refrain from participating, and those that participate in the

suffers a loss might take steps to avoid future loss by incurring information costs. This is a social
cost, as it is cheaper for companies to tell the truth.”); Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25,
at 726 (“[T]rading against a party with superior information or based on fraudulent information
will result in a loss.”); Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1280–
81 (2017) (“Manipulated markets not only distort the prices and transactions in one marketplace,
but they also have important implications for capital allocation, investments, and savings in other
markets and the greater economy.”).
41. Janet Austin, What Exactly is Market Integrity? An Analysis of One of the Core Objectives
of Securities Regulation, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 215, 232 (2017) (“If prices reflect an asset’s
fundamental value, this will result in the most efficient allocation of capital, as investors will pay
no more for securities than their inherent value.”).
42. Donald Margotta, Market Integrity, Market Efficiency, Market Accuracy, 17 BUS. REV.,
CAMBRIDGE 14, 14 (2011).
43. Haft, supra note 28, at 1051 (“If the public believes that the game is unfair and chooses
not to play, the markets will suffer and the efficient allocation of capital will be impeded.”). This
is a classic “lemons market” as first described by George Akerlof. According to Akerlof, in a
market in which buyers do not know which cars are worth their asking price and which are not
(that is, the lemons), the buyer will simply treat all cars like lemons. The result will be that worthy
car sellers will leave the markets, unable to get an accurate price for their products, and lemon
sellers will remain in the market. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 48 Q. J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970). The characteristics of
lemons markets have also been laid out in more recent scholarship:
[A] lemons market exists when four conditions are fulfilled: (1) the products on the
market vary significantly in the extent to which they have certain properties . . . and
buyers regard products with the properties in question as having less expected value
than those without them; (2) there is an asymmetry of information where buyers cannot
discriminate between products with the properties and those without, but sellers can at
least partially distinguish them; and furthermore, (3) there is no reliable signal of
quality . . . however, (4) buyers know there is a mix of products on the market.
Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Vulnerable Software: Product-Risk Norms and the Problem
of Unauthorized Access, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 45, 83–84 (2012).
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markets would discount all information and transactions.44 The
connection to market efficiency is clear. If investors refuse to
participate in the markets, this will make the markets less liquid
because there are fewer traders, which in turn makes prices less
accurate and the markets less efficient. Consequently, although market
integrity deals with the less-defined concept of fairness, it is crucial to
efficient capital allocation.
Manipulation adversely impacts market integrity because it allows
bad actors to exploit other traders in the markets. Market manipulators
are able to profit at the expense of others, not owing to diligence,
research, or luck, but rather because of an unfair advantage.45 To the
extent that investors perceive the markets as unfair, they limit the
capital they invest in the markets. Indeed, when investors question the
integrity of the markets, there is a dearth of capital available within the
markets as a whole, as was evidenced after the corporate frauds of
Enron46 and WorldCom were exposed.47 Maintaining market integrity
and the perception of fairness in the markets is critical to the proper
functioning of the financial markets.48 Thus, effective regulation
addressing market manipulation must consider both the harm the
conduct has on the integrity of the market and notions of fairness.

44. See Dionigi Gerace et al., Stock Market Manipulation on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange,
8 AUSTRALASIAN ACCT., BUS. & FIN. J. 105, 136 (2014) (“Manipulation is also associated with
increased volatility and reduced volume as investors exit the market rationally in fear of trading
with a manipulator.”); Haft, supra note 28, at 1051 (“[T]aking advantage of inside information
that is unavailable to other parties is inherently unequitable. . . . [I]nsiders unfairly obtain benefits
from and damage the public investor on the other side of the trade.”).
45. See Tom C.W. Lin, supra note 40, at 1281 (stating that “the goal of . . . market
manipulation is to distort the natural price of certain financial instruments or transactions to the
benefit of the manipulative party”).
46. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1359 (2011) (“Enron failed to appreciate the risk that
a fall in the value of its merchant assets could be coupled with a significant fall in the price of
Enron stock used as collateral, and that the firm would collapse as a result.”).
47. EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, THE MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF MARKET ABUSE: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 212 (2005) (“Such misallocation of resources has a
detrimental effect for the economy as a whole, and this can be witnessed by the dearth of capital
available for investment that followed the recent stock bubble and the eruption of the Enron,
WorldCom, Adelphia, and other corporate frauds.”).
48. See Haft, supra note 28, at 1051 (“If the public believes that the game is unfair and
chooses not to play, the markets will suffer and the efficient allocation of capital will be
impeded.”); Margotta, supra note 42, at 14 (“[G]reater market integrity will lead to security prices
that more closely reflect the value of securities.”).
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B. Defining Market Manipulation
One of the primary difficulties in dealing with market
manipulation is the absence of an agreed-upon definition.49 Securities
and commodities laws and regulations do not define illegal
manipulation. Instead, the Acts prohibit specific conduct—such as
fictitious trades—and generally harmful conduct—such as fraud,
deception, and price manipulation.50 To some, the lack of a definition
is a grave oversight of lawmakers and is the reason for the confusion
that exists in the law of market manipulation.51 But given that “[t]he
methods and techniques of manipulation are limited only by the
ingenuity of man,”52 any definition of illegal manipulation must be
capacious enough to evolve with the markets, while still establishing
meaningful boundaries as to what conduct is considered
manipulative.53
In defining illegal manipulation, courts have largely relied on
vague notions of price artificiality and on willful market misconduct
49. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Introduction: Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of
Boundaries, Gaps, and Strategies, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281, 289 n.16 (2013)
(“‘[M]anipulation’ and ‘manipulative’ are terms of art that the Supreme Court has long narrowly
construed to exclusively cover practices ‘intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting
market activity.’ Hence, neither ‘contrivance’ nor ‘manipulative’ in Section 10(b) add much, if
anything, to its coverage.” (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977)));
Amanda N. Miller, Securities and Commodities Manipulation: Is There a Principled Reason to
Distinguish the Two?, 17 PIABA BAR J. 1, 1 (2010) (“Congress did not define the term
‘manipulation’ under [the CEA nor the Exchange Act], thus leaving it to the courts to define
securities and commodities manipulation.”); Tālis J. Putniņš, Market Manipulation: A Survey, 26
J. ECON. SURVS. 952, 953 (2012) (“There is no generally accepted definition of market
manipulation . . . . Legal definitions are often intentionally not explicit, and much of the finance
and economics literature uses the term market manipulation in an imprecise manner.”).
50. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 6c (2012) (prohibiting the use of a fictitious sale in the purchase or
sale of any commodity to distort the “bona fide price” of such commodity); 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(prohibiting the use of any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the sale or
purchase of any security); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 872 (2003) (“The two most
prominent mechanisms [of an increased federal role in corporate governance] are the periodic
disclosure requirements under section 13 and the antifraud provisions and concomitant liability
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”).
51. See, e.g., Edward T. McDermott, Defining Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading:
The Futures “Squeeze,” 74 NW. U. L. REV. 202, 205 (1979) (calling manipulation law “an
embarrassment—confusing, contradictory, complex, and unsophisticated”).
52. JERRY W. MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
MARKET MANIPULATION 147 (2014).
53. As one court opined, “Congress’ decision to prohibit manipulation without defining it
apparently arose from the concern that clever manipulators would be able to evade any legislated
list of proscribed actions or elements of such a claim.” In re Soybean Futures Litig., 892 F. Supp.
1025, 1044 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
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that impacts price. For example, the Supreme Court has stated,
“‘Manipulation’ is ‘virtually a term of art when used in connection with
securities markets.’ The term refers generally to practices . . . that are
intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.”54
The Court has also stated that manipulation “connotes intentional or
willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling
or artificially affecting the price of securities.”55 Accordingly, the Court
has given meaning to the scienter requirement by way of the “statutory
authorization for the main antifraud prohibitions in the securities
laws . . . [mandating]
intentionality,
something
more
than
negligence.”56 Similarly, in interpreting manipulation under the CEA,
one court stated: “[T]he test of manipulation must largely be a practical
one . . . . The aim must be therefore to discover whether conduct has
been intentionally engaged in which has resulted in a price which does
not reflect basic forces of supply and demand.”57
Some scholars have attempted to be more precise in their
definitions of manipulation. For example, Matthijs Nelemans defines
manipulation in relation to the effect the conduct has on the price of
the asset, but he does not refer to this as an “artificial price,” as the
courts do, because of the supposed difficulties in determining when a
price is artificial.58 To Nelemans, manipulation is conduct that creates
an extraneous or improper effect on price.59 Other scholars define
manipulation as an abuse of market power that improperly impacts
market price.60 Most notably, Professors Thomas Lee Hazen and Philip
54. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 476–77 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
55. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (citation omitted).
56. Donald C. Langevoort, What Were They Thinking? Insider Trading and the Scienter
Requirement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 53 (Stephen Bainbridge ed.,
2013) (citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185).
57. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1162 (8th Cir. 1971). John George Smith, too,
described manipulation as involving price artificiality and willful misconduct:
“Manipulation” is a vague term used in a wide and inclusive manner, possessing varying
shades of meaning, and almost always conveying the idea of blame-worthiness
deserving of censure. There is usually also an implication of artificiality and of skilful
and ingenious management . . . . [I]ts most common use . . . [is] in such a way as to give
outsiders the impression that such buying or selling is the result of natural forces.
JOHN GEORGE SMITH, ORGANISED PRODUCE MARKETS 109–10 (1922).
58. See generally Matthijs Nelemans, Redefining Trade-Based Market Manipulation, 42 VAL.
U. L. REV. 1169 (2008) (describing how manipulation creates extraneous or improper “price
pressure”).
59. Id. at 1175.
60. Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 161 (2002) (“[M]anipulation is
concerned less with the immediate victim than the integrity of the market.”).
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McBride Johnson define price manipulation as “the elimination of
effective price competition in a market for cash commodities or futures
contracts (or both) through the domination of either supply or demand,
and the exercise of that domination intentionally to produce artificially
high or low prices.”61
Despite their substantive differences, from a structural standpoint,
most definitions of manipulation are quite similar. All the definitions
aim to capture the wrongfulness of manipulation in terms of deliberate
conduct, nonnegligent behavior, deception, artificial market
conditions, misleading information, fraudulent actions, or some
combination thereof. Thus, attempts to define manipulation frame the
misconduct as both intentional and harmful. Undoubtedly, these
definitions differ in what constitutes harm and how the harm ought to
be measured or identified. But structurally, market manipulation is
based on the trader’s scienter and the harm she inflicts on the market—
both of which are necessary.
This Article adopts this structural approach to manipulation—
conduct must be both intentional and harmful to the market to satisfy
any definition of manipulation. Notably, this Article views harm in
relation to the goals of anti-manipulation laws. Meaning, conduct is
harmful if it either (1) impedes the markets’ efficiency, such as through
interfering with price accuracy or negatively impacting liquidity, or (2)
impairs the markets’ integrity, such as through unfair practices that
exploit the markets or other traders. As explained in the discussion of
anti-manipulation laws below, all traditional understandings of market
manipulation entail both intent and harm. Open-market manipulation,
therefore, should be no different.
C. Anti-Manipulation Laws
Anti-manipulation laws in the United States are divided between
the Exchange Act and related regulations,62 and the CEA and related
regulations.63 Owing to the historical separation of the securities and

61. 3 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION
1240 (3d ed. 2004).
62. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78i (2012) (prohibiting price
manipulation); 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012) (prohibiting fraud and manipulation in the securities
markets); SEC Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2018) (codifying the prohibitions of 15 U.S.C. § 78j against fraud-based
manipulation).
63. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. § 6c (2012) (prohibiting manipulative and
disruptive trading strategies); 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2012) (prohibiting manipulation and false
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commodities markets, their anti-manipulation provisions have evolved
along different paths. But with the convergence of these markets, there
have been efforts in recent years to have the anti-manipulation regimes
of the two markets mirror each other as closely as possible.64 The Acts
broadly proscribe three categories of manipulative behavior: (1) fraud
and misstatements, (2) fictitious trades, and (3) price manipulation.
1. Fraud and Misstatements. Fraud and misleading statements are
the least controversial form of market manipulation, likely owing to
their common law roots. The best-known anti-manipulation provision
is section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, which grants the SEC broad
authority to prohibit “manipulative and deceptive devices and
contrivances” in relation to the purchase or sale of a security.65 Based
on section 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, which prohibits
fraud, deception, and material misstatements.66 Thus, manipulation
came to be viewed as a species of fraud, and the law developed
accordingly.67 The case law applying and interpreting section 10(b) and

information); CFTC Prohibition Against Manipulation, 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2018) [hereinafter Rule
180.1] (codifying prohibitions of 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) against fraud-based manipulation); CFTC
Prohibition Against Manipulation, 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2018) (codifying prohibitions of 7 U.S.C. §
9(3) against price manipulation).
64. See, e.g., U.S. CFTC & U.S. SEC, A JOINT REPORT OF THE SEC AND THE CFTC ON
HARMONIZATION OF REGULATION 51–54 (Oct. 16, 2009), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/
files/stellent/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/opacftc-secfinaljointreport101.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FUS4-BCH7] (identifying areas in which the Commissions’ anti-manipulation
laws diverge); see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 50–51 (2009),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF6ADDYF] (requesting that the Commissions identify areas of differing regulations and recommend
statutory amendments that would eliminate these differences).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
66. Rule 10b-5 reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
67. See John F. Barry III, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA.
L. REV. 1307, 1366–69 (1981) (explaining that the historical impetus for section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 was the need for a federal prohibition against common law fraud in the securities markets).
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Rule 10b-5 imported the principles of common law fraud into the law
of manipulation.68 To allege a claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b5, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant made a
material misstatement or omission or used a fraudulent device, (2) she
did so with scienter (that is, intent), (3) her conduct was related to the
purchase or sale of a security, (4) the plaintiff relied on the
misstatement, and (5) the plaintiff was harmed.69
Unlike the SEC’s section 10(b) authority, Congress only granted
the CFTC fraud-based anti-manipulation authority in 2010.70 Section
6(c)(1) of the CEA and Rule 180.1 are almost mirror images of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and they prohibit the same conduct.71 By
68. See id. at 1367–68.
69. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 105 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted); see also United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 368–69 (1991) (explaining that to
establish a claim under 10b-5, the Government must prove that the defendant’s purpose was to
affect the price of the security through his transactions, and that the defendant was not acting
merely with “the intent to invest”); James J. Park, Rule 10b-5 and the Rise of the Unjust
Enrichment Principle, 60 DUKE L. J. 345, 358 (2010) (noting that a Rule 10b-5 claim requires (1)
“a misrepresentation or omission” that is (2) “material . . . [or] significant to the market or
investors” and (3) is “‘in connection with’ a securities transaction” (citations omitted)).
70. Specifically, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(“Dodd-Frank Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code), amended section 6(c) of the CEA to provide that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to use or employ, or attempt
to use or employ, in connection with any swap, or a contract of sale of any commodity
in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered
entity, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance, in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission shall promulgate . . . .
7 U.S.C. § 9(1).
71. Notably, the CFTC has solidified the expansive scope of the provision, stating that
because section 6(c)(1) of the CEA prohibits manipulative devices in addition to deception, it is
a market-manipulation provision, as opposed to simply an anti-fraud provision. See 17 C.F.R.
§§ 180.1 & 180.2. Rule 180.1 states in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in connection with any
swap, or contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or contract for
future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, to intentionally or
recklessly:
(1) Use or employ, or attempt to use or employ, any manipulative device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) Make, or attempt to make, any untrue or misleading statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made not untrue or misleading;
(3) Engage, or attempt to engage, in any act, practice, or course of business,
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person; or,
(4) Deliver or cause to be delivered, or attempt to deliver or cause to be
delivered, for transmission through the mails or interstate commerce, by any
means of communication whatsoever, a false or misleading or inaccurate report
concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect
the price of any commodity in interstate commerce, knowing, or acting in
reckless disregard of the fact that such report is false, misleading or inaccurate.

FLETCHER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

LEGITIMATE YET MANIPULATIVE

11/26/2018 5:10 PM

499

modeling Rule 180.1 on Rule 10b-5, the CFTC signaled its
incorporation of decades of Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence and
interpretation.72
2. Fictitious Trades. Another form of market manipulation over
which there is little or no controversy is fictitious trading. Fictitious
trades create the illusion that there is more trading in a stock than there
is in fact.73 When a trader or a group of traders acting in concert trade
assets—with no actual change in ownership—the result is an increase
in the apparent volume of transactions in the assets.74 Examples of
fictitious trades include wash sales and matched orders, schemes in
which traders execute sham transactions with a known, prearranged
counterparty to move an asset’s price by giving the appearance of
liquidity.
Both section 9(a)(1) of the Exchange Act and section 4c(a)(1) of
the CEA prohibit trades that do not result in a change in beneficial
ownership or that are with a prearranged counterparty.75 In either
scenario, the trader does not face real financial risk, and the
transactions artificially inflate the volume of trading associated with
the asset, thereby affecting the price.76 Again, the transactions involved
in this form of manipulation impede the operation of the markets,
thereby harming the markets’ allocative and pricing efficiency.
Because of the complete absence of any legitimate justification for

Notwithstanding the foregoing, no violation of this subsection shall exist where
the person mistakenly transmits, in good faith, false or misleading or inaccurate
information to a price reporting service.
Id. § 180.1(a).
72. The CFTC’s incorporation of Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence has been explicit:
Given the similarities between CEA section 6(c)(1) and Exchange Act section 10(b),
the [CFTC] deems it appropriate and in the public interest to model final Rule 180.1
on SEC Rule 10b-5. To account for the differences between the securities markets and
derivatives markets, the [CFTC] will be guided, but not controlled, by the substantial
body of judicial precedent applying the comparable language of SEC Rule 10b-5.
Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive
Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,399 (July 14, 2011) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180).
73. 8 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. § 81:14 (4th ed.) (“[F]ictitious trades create a false
impression of increased trading activity, thereby creating an impression of greater liquidity in the
market for the commodity or future or suggesting that important news is soon to come.”).
74. Id. (explaining that “wash trades . . . are fictitious, prearranged sales in which the same
parties agree to a pair of offsetting trades for the same commodity, at no economic risk or net
change in beneficial ownership”).
75. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78i.
76. See JOHN L. TEALL, FINANCIAL TRADING AND INVESTING 337 (2013).
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fictitious trades, this behavior is universally decried as improper and
illegal.77
3. Price Manipulation. Price manipulation is explicitly prohibited
in both Acts. Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act prohibits
transactions that affect the price of a security for the purpose of
inducing another to buy or sell the security.78 The SEC, however, has
not made much use of this provision, opting instead to rely on section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 to prosecute manipulation.
Section 6(c)(3) of the CEA also outlaws the direct or indirect
manipulation of the price of a commodity or swap.79 Prior to the 2010
amendments to the CEA, price manipulation was the primary antimanipulation provision available to the Commission.80 As such, unlike
the SEC, the CFTC has had to rely heavily on this provision to address
market manipulation.
The elements of price manipulation include both intent and harm.
To successfully allege price manipulation, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) the defendant possessed an ability to influence market prices; (2)
an artificial price existed;81 (3) the defendant caused the artificial price;

77. See Gregory Scopino, Do Automatic Trading Systems Dream of Manipulating the Price
of Futures Contracts? Policing Markets for Improper Trading Practices by Algorithmic Robots, 67
FLA. L. REV. 221, 263–64 (2015) (discussing the unlawfulness of transactions that are
noncompetitive or that are believed to facilitate noncompetitive trading under section 4c(a) and
discussing Congress’s desire to outlaw trading schemes that give the appearance of trading in an
open market while negating the risk of price competition in that market).
78. Section 9(a)(2) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, or any member of a national securities exchange . . . [t]o effect,
alone or with 1 or more other persons, a series of transactions in any security registered
on a national securities exchange, any security not so registered, or in connection with
any security-based swap or security-based swap agreement with respect to such security
creating actual or apparent active trading in such security, or raising or depressing the
price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security
by others.
15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2).
79. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (prohibiting “directly or indirectly, [the] use or employ . . . in connection
with any swap, or a contract of sale of any commodity . . . [of] any manipulative or deceptive
device”).
80. Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Commodity Market Manipulation: A Survey, 5 J.
COMMODITY MKTS. 1, 13 (2017) (“In 2010, believing that the CEA’s existing anti-manipulation
provisions were inadequate, Congress added language to the law as part of Dodd-Frank that
effectively incorporated the anti-manipulation provisions of the Securities Act . . . .”).
81. An artificial price is a price that does not reflect basic forces of supply and demand. In re
Ind. Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, Inc., No. 75-14, 1982 WL 30249, at *7 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 17, 1982).
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and (4) the defendant specifically intended82 to cause the artificial
price.83 The requirement that the plaintiff prove both specific intent
and price artificiality is the reason the SEC has avoided pleading price
artificiality to prove manipulation84 and, more notably, the reason the
CFTC, in its 40-year history, has notched only a single successful
prosecution of price manipulation.85
*

*

*

The above discussion of the relevant anti-manipulation provisions
confirms the structural definitional requirements identified in Part I.B.
Yet, in pursuing claims of open-market manipulation, the
Commissions have ignored the requirement for harm, focusing
exclusively on intent. Their approach has resulted in significant
confusion and discord in the markets, as participants try to determine
what constitutes open-market manipulation.
II. UNDERSTANDING OPEN-MARKET MANIPULATION
Open-market manipulation does not involve misstatements,
fraud, fictitious trades, or deceit; the transactions are permissible and
involve no objectively bad acts.86 In the absence of traditional forms of
82. The specific intent element is satisfied if the defendant “acted (or failed to act) with the
purpose or conscious object of causing or effecting a price or price trend in the market that did
not reflect the legitimate forces of supply and demand.” Id.
83. See Anthony Candido, Freedom to Trade in the Age of Heightened Market Protection,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 3, 2016), https://corpgov.law
.harvard.edu/2016/04/03/freedom-to-trade-in-the-age-of-heightened-market-protection
[https://perma.cc/794P-2CJ2] (summarizing CFTC’s four-part test).
84. See Multer, supra note 15, at 115 (explaining that under Rule 10b-5, a trader can be held
liable for market manipulation based on her intent).
85. In 2009, the CFTC prosecuted its first price manipulation case under the CEA—a victory
after almost 30 years of the Commission’s existence. See generally DiPlacido v. CFTC, 364 F.
App’x 657 (2d Cir. 2009) (reviewing a CFTC decision on price manipulation and addressing issues
of first impression within the case). This does not include the settlements for manipulation that
the Commission has secured over the decades.
86. Abel Ramirez, Jr., Are Short Sellers Really the Enemy of Efficient Securities Markets? A
Discussion of Misconceptions After the Financial Crisis, 42 SEC. REG. L.J. 31, 38 (2014) (noting
that open-market manipulations are “accomplished by using entirely legitimate transactions, but
[are] still subject to enforcement under Rule 10b-5 if the intended effect is ‘a false pricing signal
to the market.’” (citation omitted)). One scholar has described this distinction between traditional
and open-market forms of manipulation as follows:
[T]raditional manipulation involves conduct that is “inherently or otherwise illegal,
such as fictitious transactions” . . . whereas open-market manipulation consists of
facially legitimate transactions that make the fraud harder to detect. Claims of openmarket manipulation allege attempts to “increase the price of a security or commodity
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misconduct, the Commissions and private plaintiffs have alleged that
open-market trades are manipulative because of the manipulative
intent of the trader.87 This framing of open-market manipulation,
however, does not articulate how the transactions harm the market,
which is key to identifying manipulative activity.
Part II addresses the first question this Article poses: Can
legitimate transactions distort the markets? To begin, this Part
explores the mechanics of open-market manipulation, categorizing
these schemes into two categories: naked and covered open-market
manipulation. Using case studies, Part II demonstrates that traders can
and do use open-market transactions to distort the market. Part II also
highlights the inadequacies of the Commissions’ intent-centric focus,
given its inability to coherently articulate how open-market trades
distort—that is, harm—the markets.
A. The Mechanics of Open-Market Manipulation
1. Typology: Naked and Covered Manipulation Schemes. Openmarket manipulation can be accomplished through naked or covered
schemes.88 Both forms aim to profit from an asset’s price movement,
but each scheme accomplishes the goal differently. Naked openmarket manipulation schemes (“naked manipulation”) distort the
by trading, and to sell at a profit before the price returns to its ‘correct’ level.”
Tara E. Levens, Too Fast, Too Frequent? High-Frequency Trading and Securities Class Actions,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (2015) (citations omitted).
87. Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 1031, 1053
(2016) (“The hallmark of actions to pursue fraud and manipulation lies in the requirement to
show that defendants intended to lie or to deliberately alter prices in securities markets . . . .
Authorities must adduce evidence of manipulative intention (scienter) to artificially distort price
formation.” (citation omitted)); see also Michael A. Asaro, ‘Masri’ and Open-Market
Manipulation Schemes, 239 N.Y. L.J. ONLINE (2008), available at https://www.akingump.com/
images/content/1/2/v4/1243/07005080021AkinG.pdf [https://perma.cc/65YU-9TNU].
88. Some scholars refer to open-market manipulation broadly as trade-based manipulation.
This author believes that the classification of open-market manipulation as naked or covered
better aligns with and describes the conduct at issue. See Multer, supra note 15, at 97–98
(“Manipulative schemes are referred to as ‘open market manipulations’ when the alleged scheme
is accomplished solely through the use of facially legitimate open market transactions. . . . [It does
not involve] any conduct that is inherently or otherwise illegal, such as fictitious transactions, wash
sales or by disseminating false reporting.”); Michael J. Aitken, Frederick H. deB. Harris & Shan
Ji, Trade-Based Manipulation and Market Efficiency: A Cross-Market Comparison 1(Nov. 18,
2009)
(draft)
(available
at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=
10.1.1.629.2355&rep=rep1&type=pdf) [https://perma.cc/7XA5-Q2XC] (providing that “Allen
and Gale (1992) define trade-based manipulation as a trader attempting to manipulate a stock
price simply by buying and then selling (or vice versa), without releasing any false information or
taking any other publicly observable action designed to alter the security’s value”).

FLETCHER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

LEGITIMATE YET MANIPULATIVE

11/26/2018 5:10 PM

503

market only through transactions.89 Any profit the manipulator earns
from a naked manipulation scheme is from transactions executed on
the open market.90 In short, the trader must buy the asset at a low price
and be able to sell it at a high price.91 The trader, then, profits on the
difference between the low purchase price and the high sale price.92
Naked manipulation is difficult because as the trader tries to buy low,
her purchases will, in theory, increase the price of the asset.93 Likewise,
as she tries to sell at the increased price, her sales will decrease the
price.94 To be successful in a naked manipulation scheme, the trader
must have some way of preventing the price from increasing as she
purchases, decreasing as she sells, or both.
In covered open-market manipulation schemes (“covered
manipulation”), on the other hand, a manipulator trades to trigger
payments or rights in a separate contract or financial instrument, the
pricing of which is affected by the trades.95 In short, covered
manipulation involves open-market trades executed to impact the
trader’s interest in a separate, but related, obligation. A
straightforward example is a company executive whose bonus is tied to
the company’s stock reaching a contractually established price
threshold. Suppose the executive trades in her company’s stock to exert

89. Nelemans, supra note 58, at 1169 (“Trade-based market manipulation . . . is thought of
as trading shares specifically to cause a price change.”).
90. Fischel & Ross, supra note 18, at 523 (stating that in “[t]hese schemes . . . the trader’s
profit results directly from the trades”).
91. Id. at 512.
92. Id.
93. Jerry W. Markham, Commodities Regulation: Fraud, Manipulation & Other Claims, 13
COMMODITIES REG. § 15:3 (Apr. 2018) (noting that traders have used manipulative maneuvers
such as storing commodities to establish a scarcity and create favor for themselves, but that such
maneuvers make it more difficult to “bury the corpse”); see also Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Guojun
Wu, Stock Market Manipulations, 79 J. BUS. 1915, 1916 (2006) (“[B]y purchasing a large amount
of stock, a trader can drive the price up. If the trader can then sell shares and if the price does not
adjust to the sales, then the trader can profit. Of course, we should expect that such a strategy
would not work.”); Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices—The
Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. REG. 281, 293 (1991) [hereinafter Markham, Manipulation]
(explaining that someone who corners the market will need to “bury the corpse”—that is, dispose
of the actual commodity used in the corner without significantly depressing prices—and that
otherwise, she must forfeit the value of the corner).
94. Markham, Manipulation, supra note 93, at 293.
95. See, e.g., Fischel & Ross, supra note 18, at 523 (describing what they call “contract-based
manipulation,” wherein “the trader’s profit results from his ability to trigger a contractual right
or benefit by trading. An example would be purchases by a corporate officer that raise the price
of his firm’s shares . . . sufficient[ly] to trigger a bonus clause in his compensation package based
on the firm’s stock price”).
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upward pressure on its price. The increased stock price would trigger
her bonus rights, and the executive would profit from her employment
contract. The executive’s conduct is an example of covered
manipulation because of the connection between her trades and her
contractual bonus payment.
Covered manipulation schemes are more complex and oftentimes
use derivatives to profit from the price-moving effect of their trades. A
derivative is a financial product that derives its value from the change
in value of an underlying asset or from the occurrence of an external
event.96 Derivatives allow traders to profit from an asset’s changed
value without the need to own the asset itself. Derivatives can be linked
to equities; commodities, such as wheat, corn, or oil; or rates, such as
foreign exchange rates or interest rates.97 Derivative instruments
include forwards, futures, options, and swaps—each of which can be
combined with additional features to increase their complexity and
malleability.98 Derivatives have become commonplace in the financial
markets and are useful tools for risk mitigation and exposure.99 An
96. William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: From
Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 815 (2013) (“[D]erivatives
are contracts that specify payments based on the performance of external securities; the parties
to the derivative need not own the securities referenced.”); Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Hazardous
Hedging, supra note 5, at 824 (“A derivative is a financial instrument whose value derives from
changes in the value of an underlying asset or external event, such as a rainfall, inflation, or a
natural catastrophe.” (citations omitted)); Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the
2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011) (“Derivatives are literally bets—agreements
between parties that one will pay the other a sum of money that is determined by whether or not
a particular event occurs in the future.”).
97. See generally Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1929
(2017) [hereinafter Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation] (discussing the intersection between
benchmark manipulation and derivatives using interest rates, foreign exchange, and crude oil);
Kimberly Amadeo, Derivatives, Their Risks and Their Rewards, BALANCE (May 1, 2018),
https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-derivatives-3305833 [https://perma.cc/GVC7-2WJE]
(“Derivatives are often used for commodities, such as oil, gasoline, or gold. Another asset class is
currencies, often the U.S. dollar. There are derivatives based on stocks or bonds. Still others use
interest rates, such as yield on the 10-year Treasury note.”).
98. A forward is an obligation to buy or sell the underlying asset at a specified price on a
future date. A future is a standardized forward that is traded on an exchange. An option is the
right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an asset on a specified date, at a specified price. And
“[s]waps are agreements between two counterparties to exchange a series of cash payments for a
stated period of time.” Michael Chui, Derivative Markets, Products and Participants: An
Overview, in 35 IFC BULLETINS 5 (2012); Fletcher, Hazardous Hedging, supra note 96, at 825–26
(discussing that all derivatives have two foundational building blocks—options and forwards). See
generally Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, supra note 97 (discussing the use of derivatives in
benchmark manipulation).
99. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 46, at 1363 (“[F]irms can transfer credit risk through
products such as swaps or other derivatives.”).
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equity call option, for example, grants the purchaser the right to
purchase a specified number of shares on a specified date.100 A call
option is valuable if the trader believes that the equity’s price will
increase in the future. For example, suppose that a trader believes that
Snap Inc.’s stock will rise once the company releases its quarterly
earnings reports on March 31, 2018. Let us assume that today, Snap
Inc. is trading at $14 per share. The trader executes call options giving
her the right to purchase 100 shares of Snap Inc. at $15 per share on
April 1, 2018—the strike date. If prior to the strike date, the value of
Snap Inc.’s stock rises to $20 per share, then the options are “in the
money,” that is, profitable. The trader would exercise her options and
earn a profit of $500. If, however, Snap Inc.’s shares do not go above
$15 per share, the options are “out the money,” and the options would
expire, worthless. Derivatives, therefore, are inextricably bound to
both the commodities and futures markets, as their valuation is directly
linked to the assets on which they are based.
Covered manipulation schemes exploit the connection between
derivatives, on the one hand, and the commodities or securities—or
both—markets, on the other, by trading in the latter to affect the price
of the former. To continue with the equity call option example above,
assume that as the strike date approaches, Snap Inc.’s stock does not
rise above $15 per share. Not wanting her options to expire out the
money, the trader enters the market and purchases a large number of
Snap Inc. shares, pushing the price upwards. The upward price pressure
changes the profitability of her options contract, which in the absence
of her open market trades, would have been worthless. Importantly, in
contrast to a naked manipulation scheme, the trader in this coveredmanipulation scheme does not need to sell her Snap Inc. shares to
benefit. If she successfully exerts upward pressure on Snap Inc.’s
shares, her options would be in the money and profitable, without her
ever selling shares on the market. Derivatives, therefore, enable
manipulators to avoid the market forces that would limit or eliminate
their ability to profit from open-market manipulation.
2. Common Strategies. Open-market manipulation schemes
typically employ certain trading strategies to move the price of the

100. Tom Prieto, Tax Strategies for Long-Short Equity, 93 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 118, 120
(2014) (“One party to the equity option pays a premium to another party for the right, but not
the obligation, to purchase or sell stock . . . . An equity call option is for the purchase of stock and
an equity put option is for the sale of stock.”).
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asset for the trader’s benefit. These trading strategies are not per se
impermissible, but they usually attract the attention of the
Commissions and private plaintiffs as indicators of market
manipulation. The two most common strategies implicated in
allegations of open-market manipulation are “short selling” and
“marking the close.”
Generally, traders short sell a security if they believe its price will
decrease.101 In a security-based short sale, the trader borrows a security,
sells the borrowed security, repurchases the security after the price has
fallen, and then returns the borrowed security to its owner.102 The
trader profits from the difference between the sale and purchase price,
less any fees she paid to borrow the security. In the commodities
market, a trader can achieve the same result with derivatives and
without the need to borrow the underlying asset. For example, suppose
a trader believes that an upcoming off-shore exploration will result in
more oil being available, thereby reducing the price of oil in the
upcoming month. She purchases 100 put options with a strike price of
$75, which give her the right to sell oil at $75 per barrel before the
expiration of the option. If the price of oil falls to $65 per barrel, the
trader is entitled to the difference between the market price and her
strike price, less any fees paid to purchase the put option.103 Notably,
the trader earns her profits without ever owning or borrowing a barrel
of oil; through the put option she is able to gain exposure to the
decrease in the price of oil without the additional expense of owning
100 barrels of oil.
Short selling is not illegal, although there are some who find the
practice to be objectionable as a form of gambling.104 Aggressive or
concerted short sales can exert price pressure on asset prices, and the
Commissions and private plaintiffs have alleged this behavior to be
manipulative.105 However, as some courts and lawmakers know, short
101. Short Sales, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm [https://perma.cc/8D6RZD95].
102. Id.; see also McCoy, Pavlov & Wachter, supra note 33, at 1369 (“In a liquid market,
investors are able to express their negative views by short selling, or by taking a long position if
they believe there is possibility of appreciation. Through this process, fundamental market value
is achieved.”).
103. In this scenario, her gross profit would be ($75 - $65) x 100 = $1000.
104. See, e.g., James J. Angel & Douglas M. McCabe, The Business Ethics of Short Selling and
Naked Short Selling, 85 J. BUS. ETHICS 239, 243–44 (2009) (describing the short-and-distort
campaigns involved with short selling as objectionable, while categorizing short selling as
gambling).
105. See Sharette v. Credit Suisse Int’l, 127 F. Supp. 3d 60, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding
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sales can be beneficial to the markets by “contributing to efficient price
discovery, mitigating market bubbles, increasing market liquidity,
promoting capital formation, facilitating hedging and other risk
management activities, and importantly, limiting upward market
manipulations.”106 The double-edged nature of short sales, therefore,
makes it particularly important to identify when traders use the
strategy maliciously, instead of beneficially.
Another strategy that some consider indicative of open-market
manipulation is known as “marking the close” or “banging the close.”
This strategy involves making large transactions at or near the close of
trading.107 End-of-day trading often has an outsized impact on asset
pricing, thereby making trades done near the end of closing more
effective in impacting the asset’s price.108 Additionally, many
derivatives are valued based on the end-of-day prices of the underlying
asset, thus making the end-of-day price significant in calculating an
instrument’s value.109 The possibility, then, of changing the closing

manipulation where the plaintiffs were able to show that Credit Suisse drove down Energy
Conversion Devices stock prices while short-sale prices significantly rose); GFL Advantage Fund,
Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 211 (3d Cir. 2001) (involving a defendant that alleged that GFL
Advantage engaged in market manipulation by depressing stock prices through concentrated
short sales).
106. Press Release, SEC, Statement of Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Short
Selling and Issuer Stock Repurchases (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008235.htm [https://perma.cc/TG77-V8W7].
107. The CFTC defines “banging the close” as:
A manipulative or disruptive trading practice whereby a trader buys or sells a large
number of futures contracts during the closing period of a futures contract . . . in order
to benefit an even larger position in an option, swap, or other derivative that is cash
settled based on the futures settlement price on that day.
CFTC
Glossary,
CFTC,
https://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/
CFTCGlossary/glossary_b.html [https://perma.cc/3UH5-HUTN]; see also Alexander Osipovich,
Bitcoin Futures Manipulation 101: How ‘Banging the Close’ Works, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2017,
7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-futures-manipulation-101-how-banging-theclose-works-1513425600 [https://perma.cc/Z6BB-EWLL] (describing “banging the close” as a
scenario that “involves pushing around the price of bitcoin when the futures contract expires”).
108. See Carole Comerton-Forde & Tālis J. Putniņš, Measuring Closing Price Manipulation,
20 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 135, 136 (2011) (finding that closing-price manipulation—that is,
end-of-day trading—causes abnormal day-end returns that are approximately six times larger
than their usual level and that significantly distorts prices, which is of great consequence due to
the widespread use of closing prices).
109. As an example, suppose a trader holds a call option that gives her the right to purchase
100 barrels of oil at $75 per barrel. A call option is the right to buy a security at a given price on
the strike date. Call options are valuable if the option holder believes that the price of the asset
will rise. Assume that the valuation of the trader’s option—that is, the determination of the final
price of oil—is linked to the market price on January 31, 2018. If on the strike date, the end-ofday price of oil is $80 per barrel, she would profit on the spread—$5 per barrel.
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price of an asset can be quite valuable to covered manipulation
schemes. However, high volume end-of-day trading is not per se
manipulative, and there are legitimate reasons for these types of
transactions.110 Studies have shown that trading in the securities
markets is heaviest just before the close of the market because traders
monitor market activity and their positions throughout the day before
executing their trades.111 Because of the benefits and drawbacks
associated with this strategy, it is necessary to find a way to delineate
between traders who execute trades at the end of the day to manipulate
the market and those who do so for legitimate reasons. Otherwise, the
markets will operate inefficiently.
B. Manipulating Openly: Case Studies
A fundamental issue concerning open-market manipulation is
whether it is feasible—both on a theoretical and practical level.
Theoretically, that the defendant is executing permissible trades raises
the question of whether market manipulation can exist without
misconduct. Practically, the legitimacy of the transactions seems to
immunize them from regulatory inquiry. But legitimate, open-market
transactions can distort the markets. The facial legitimacy of the
transactions lulls one into believing that misconduct is absent and that
the transactions are not acts of manipulation. As demonstrated in the
four case studies below, the misconduct and market distortion stem
from the negative impact the transactions have on the market, in
addition to the manipulative intent of the defendant.

110. This possibility is not reflected in the SEC’s settlement orders, which routinely find
defendants guilty of market manipulation solely on the basis of marking the close. See, e.g., In re
Kocherhans, Exchange Act Release No. 36556, 52 S.E.C. 528, 529 (Dec. 6, 1995) (involving a
defendant who, over a 6-month period, made 47 purchases within 15 minutes of market close in
the accounts of family members and customers in order to satisfy margin calls); In re Levin,
Exchange Act Release No. 31124, 50 S.E.C. 1245, 1246 (Sept. 1, 1992) (involving a defendant who
marked the close during 4 separate periods—ranging from 3 weeks to 2 months—on 2 exchanges
in order to satisfy margin calls); In re Doherty, Exchange Act Release No. 29545, 50 S.E.C. 624,
626 (Aug. 12, 1991) (involving defendants who, for a period of four-and-a-half months, placed the
final order of the day so that the closing price would be impacted by a higher ask price, which
helped the defendants satisfy margin calls); In re Schaefer, Exchange Act Release No. 13736, 1977
S.E.C. LEXIS 1302, at *4 (July 11, 1977) (involving a defendant who successfully caused stock to
close at a price higher than the prior sale price on approximately 253 out of 424 trading days in
order to increase the value of the defendant’s holdings).
111. Fischel & Ross, supra note 18, at 520.
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1. Naked Price Control: Markowski v. SEC. Markowski v. SEC112
presents a quintessential example of naked manipulation and aptly
demonstrates that it is possible to manipulate the markets using facially
legitimate transactions. In this case, Global America, Inc. (“Global”)
underwrote the initial public offering (“IPO”) of Mountaintop
Corporation.113 For six months thereafter, Global dominated the
market for Mountaintop’s securities, as the primary purchaser and
seller, thereby keeping the price artificially high.114 Global’s attempts
to control Mountaintop’s price ultimately failed, and, notably, once
Global withdrew from the market, Mountaintop’s securities declined
by approximately 75 percent in a single day.115
It was undisputed that all the trades Global executed in
Mountaintop’s securities were permissible—they were real trades that
did not involve deceit or misrepresentation.116 The SEC, however,
argued that the defendants were guilty of market manipulation because
of their intent.117 To bolster its claim of manipulative intent, the SEC
highlighted (1) Global’s dominance of the market for Mountaintop’s
securities118 and (2) the fact that many of Global’s clients invested in
the IPO and would suffer significant losses if Mountaintop traded
below its offering price.119 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the
Commission, finding that the defendants’ intent to manipulate the
markets was sufficient, on its own, to hold them liable for market
manipulation.120 Although the court’s holding feels correct given the

112. Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
113. Michael Markowski and Joseph Riccio Enjoined From Manipulating the Markets for the
Securities of Three Companies, SEC NEWS DIG., Mar. 4, 1996, at 1–2, https://www.sec.gov/
news/digest/1996/dig030496.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9Z3-HAKN].
114. See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 4, Markowski v. SEC, 537 U.S. 819 (2002)
(No. 01-1749), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/osg/briefs/2002/01/01/2001-1749.resp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GNU5-K5X8] (describing Global’s after-market trading in Mountaintop’s
securities). According to the SEC, Global supported the price of Mountaintop’s securities both
by (1) maintaining high bid prices (that is, offers to buy) and (2) purchasing all unwanted
securities and absorbing them into its inventory. Markowski, 274 F.3d at 527.
115. Markowski, 274 F.3d at 527. Indeed, Global’s attempt at propping up Mountaintop’s
prices ultimately resulted in $1.4 million in losses and the demise of Global. Id. at 527–29.
116. See id. at 528 (“Global’s bids and trades in this case were ‘real’—they involved real
customers, real transactions, and real money . . . .”).
117. See id. at 530 (presenting the SEC’s position that Global purchased Mountaintop
securities with the purpose of maintaining the security’s apparent market price).
118. Id. at 527.
119. See id. at 530 (“[A trader for Global] said that he maintained Global’s bids because he
feared a drop in price and the customer complaints it would generate.”).
120. Id.
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havoc the defendants wreaked on the market, it is disconcerting that
the sole stated basis for liability was the defendants’ manipulative
intent. A defendant’s intent is salient to demonstrating the
purposefulness of her actions, but intent is inadequate as an
explanation of why otherwise legitimate transactions are manipulative.
2. Multiparty Scheme: United States v. Mulheren. United States v.
Mulheren121 provides a poignant example of how covered manipulation
may be accomplished through the coordinated efforts of multiple
parties. John Mulheren, a market trader, and Ivan Boesky, a
businessperson and banker, had a longstanding business relationship
in which the two shared market information and trading tips.122 Boesky
acquired 4.9 percent of the outstanding stock of Gulf & Western
Industries, Inc. (“G&W”) as the first step in a proposed leveraged
buyout of the company.123 After G&W rejected his acquisition offer,
Boesky offered to sell his shares back to the company at $45 per share,
which was slightly above the current trading price of the company’s
stock.124 G&W stated that it was only willing to repurchase the shares
at market price.125
The day after his conversation with G&W, Boesky called
Mulheren and stated, among other things, that “it would be great” if
G&W traded at $45 per share.126 Shortly after his conversation with
Boesky, Mulheren placed a series of purchase orders for a total of
75,000 shares of G&W, all within a 10-minute span.127 At the beginning
of Mulheren’s trading, G&W traded at $44.75; by the end of
Mulheren’s trading, G&W shares traded at $45 per share.128 Within
minutes of G&W’s shares reaching $45, Boesky sold his entire
ownership stake back to G&W at $45 per share.129 At the end of trading

121. United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991).
122. Id. at 366.
123. Id. A leveraged buyout is the acquisition of another company, in which primarily debt is
used to fund the cost of acquisition. See, e.g., Leveraged Buyout, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a leveraged buyout as “[t]he purchase of a publicly held
corporation’s outstanding stock by its management or outside investors, financed mainly with
funds borrowed from investment bankers or brokers and usu. secured by the corporation’s
assets”).
124. Mulheren, 938 F.2d at 366.
125. Id. at 367.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 367–68.
128. Id. at 368.
129. Id.
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for the day, however, G&W shares fell to $43.625, and Mulheren’s firm
lost $64,406 on his G&W purchases.130 Notably, the decrease in G&W’s
price was in stark contrast to the security’s usual price change; the
decrease represented a price variance over 10 times what was
customary.131
The SEC charged Mulheren with market manipulation in
violation of Rule 10b-5 on the basis that he intended to manipulate the
markets when he purchased G&W shares.132 Mulheren’s concentrated
purchase orders—executed after his conversation with Boesky—that
caused G&W’s share price to increase were all indicative of an intent
to manipulate, according to the SEC.133 The Second Circuit rejected the
SEC’s allegations, finding that the Commission did not prove
Mulheren’s subjective intent to manipulate, nor did the Commission
prove that the transactions lacked an investment motive.134 Notably, in
rejecting the SEC’s manipulation claim, the Second Circuit seemed to
be looking for anything akin to market harm—fictitious trades, fraud,
or even an artificial price.135 By relying on manipulative intent, the SEC
failed to demonstrate how and why Mulheren’s transactions were
manipulative, and, consequently, the Commission was unsuccessful.136
3. Last-Minute Trading: SEC v. Masri. SEC v. Masri137 presents
another example of covered manipulation and, again, highlights the
shortcomings inherent in the Commissions’ intent-centric theory of
liability. Moises Saba Masri was an active securities trader, typically
making thousands of trades each year.138 Masri sold put options on over

130. Id.
131. Id. at 367–68 (indicating that between October 16, 1985, and October 17, 1985, G&W
stock moved from $44.75 to $44.875 and then to $45 at different times of the day, but that on
October 17, 1985, G&W common stock closed at $43.625 after the defendants sold a large amount
of G&W common stock). For a discussion of price volatility, see infra Part III.B.
132. See id. (“The government’s theory of prosecution in this case is
straightforward[:] . . . [W]hen an investor, who is neither a fiduciary nor an insider, engages in
securities transactions in the open market with the sole intent to affect the price of the security,
the transaction is manipulative and violates Rule 10b–5.”).
133. See id. at 369 (discussing the SEC’s theories of Mulheren’s manipulative intent).
134. Id.
135. See id. at 370–71 (stating that traditional indicia of manipulation are missing from the
alleged manipulation scheme, such as fictitious trades, matched orders, wash sales, etc.).
136. See id. at 372 (“[I]n the absence of other indicia of manipulation—and there are none—
the fact that Mulheren dominated the market between 9:30 a.m. and 11:10 a.m. on October 17,
1985 . . . carries little weight.”).
137. SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
138. Id. at 363.
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800,000 shares of T.V. Azteca S.A. de C.V. American Depositary
Receipts (“TZA”) with a strike price of $5 per share that expired on
August 21, 1999.139 As the exercise date approached, TZA share prices
began to decline, approaching $5 per share and eventually dropping
below $5.140 On August 20, Masri purchased 200,000 shares of TZA
stock in the last 10 minutes of trading, moving TZA’s price from below
$5 to $5.125 per share.141 Had TZA’s shares remained below $5, Masri
would have been required to spend $4.3 million to purchase the put
options.142 Instead, in response to his blitzkrieg trading, TZA share
price rose, and the options expired worthless, sparing Masri from
incurring any losses.143 Notably, Masri’s trades accounted for 94
percent of all TZA purchases in the last hour of trading and 75 percent
for the day.144
In alleging that Masri was guilty of open-market manipulation, the
SEC inferred Masri’s manipulative intent from the “timing, size, and
incremental execution” of the trades, among other things.145 Masri
asserted that his trades were economically rational and were motivated
by other unexpired options he held on TZA stock.146 After a careful
analysis of the matter, the court held that liability for open-market
transactions can be imposed if the plaintiff proves that “but for the
manipulative intent, the defendant would not have conducted the
transaction.”147 The court recognized Masri’s explanation for his trades
as plausible but refused to grant his motion to dismiss because the
SEC’s evidence of intent, albeit weak, was sufficient.148 Interestingly,
although speaking in the language of “manipulative intent,” the court
was in search of evidence that Masri’s conduct harmed the market by

139. Id. at 363–65. A put option gives the holder the right, but not obligation, to purchase the
underlying asset at the strike price on the agreed-upon date (known as the strike or exercise date).
See Fletcher, Hazardous Hedging, supra note 5, at 825 (defining an option). In this case, Masri
sold put options on TZA, which meant that if the buyer of the put option chose, Masri would be
obligated to buy TZA shares at five dollars per share on the strike date. As the put seller, Masri
expected the price of TZA to increase. If the price of TZA fell below five dollars per share, Masri
would be obligated to pay more for the shares than its market price.
140. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 364–66.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 366.
143. Id. at 365–66.
144. Id. at 365.
145. Id. at 373.
146. Id. at 373–75.
147. Id. at 372.
148. Id. at 375.
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“‘artificially’ affecting the price of the security or injecting inaccurate
information into the market.”149 In the absence of evidence of harm to
the market or other market participants, the court was unwilling to
impose liability, despite the defendant’s admittedly suspicious
conduct.150
4. Guaranteed Profits: CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors. CFTC v.
Amaranth Advisors151 is a case in which the government successfully
held the defendants liable for open-market manipulation. As part of an
archetypal covered manipulation scheme, the Amaranth defendants
executed open-market trades to ensure the profitability of related
derivatives.152 Amaranth Advisors (“Amaranth”) was a hedge fund,
specializing in natural gas trading, that had approximately $9 billion of
assets under management.153 On two separate occasions in February
and April 2006, Amaranth accumulated a substantial number of gas
futures contracts that traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange
(“NYMEX”).154 On the final day of trading, during the last 30 minutes,
Amaranth flooded the NYMEX natural gas markets with offers to sell
its gas futures.155 In the last 4 minutes of trading, Amaranth was
responsible for 99 percent of all trading in the asset.156 Amaranth also
held a large position in natural gas swaps.157 The profitability of
Amaranth’s swaps depended on the decrease of natural gas prices on
the NYMEX.158 In sum, Amaranth marked the close on the NYMEX
gas futures which benefitted its position on natural gas swaps that were
valued by reference to the NYMEX gas closing price.
The CFTC charged Amaranth and its principal trader, Brian
Hunter, with attempted price manipulation.159 Relying on Hunter’s text

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 373.
Id. at 375.
CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id. at 525.
LLOYD DIXON, NOREEN CLANCY & KRISHNA B. KUMAR, HEDGE FUNDS AND
SYSTEMIC RISK 34 n.10 (2012).
154. Amaranth, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 530.
155. Id. at 527 (“Less than half an hour before the closing range, Hunter disclosed his trading
strategy to another trader . . . .”).
156. See id.
157. A commodity swap is a derivative “in which the payout to at least one counterparty is
based on the price of a commodity or the level of a commodity index.” Id. (citation omitted).
158. Id. at 528.
159. The CFTC did not have the authority to bring non-price-manipulation cases in 2006. Id.
at 525.
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messages in which he articulated a clear intent to manipulate the
NYMEX, the CFTC was able to easily demonstrate manipulative
intent.160 Importantly, the CFTC also provided evidence of how the
transactions undermined the markets, which was key to the
Commission’s successful prosecution. In light of the defendants’ stated
manipulative intent and the evidence of market injury, the court found
Amaranth and Hunter guilty of market manipulation.161 In its analysis,
the court focused on the fact that Hunter’s trades disrupted the
markets because the deluge of last-minute orders could not be filled
before the close of trade.162 The court also noted that Amaranth
improperly favored its swaps’ profitability by marking the close to
depress the NYMEX closing price.163 In sum, Amaranth’s conduct was
manipulative because the defendants possessed the intent to
manipulate and because their trades injured the markets and exploited
their counterparties.
Importantly, Amaranth highlights the need for analytical clarity,
particularly in instances of open-market manipulation. The court said
it was only looking at manipulative intent and overt acts, regardless of
the legality of the acts. Yet, the court’s analysis considered the impact
of the defendant’s transactions on the market. The court’s and the
CFTC’s approach here is laudable because it considered the impact of
the defendants’ conduct on the market in deciding whether the
legitimate transactions were manipulative. However, conflating the
analysis of intent with that of market impact exacerbates the confusion
over what the law requires before a trader may be held liable for openmarket manipulation.
*

*

*

Market manipulation is feasible through open-market
transactions, as demonstrated from the case studies above. The
Commissions and private parties have achieved varying degrees of
success in proving that, mostly because of their singular focus on the
intent of the trader as the basis of liability. In relying solely on intent,
plaintiffs limit their ability to hold perpetrators accountable for openmarket manipulation because intent does not explain why facially

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 532–33.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 528.
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legitimate transactions are manipulative.164 As analyzed in greater
detail in Part II.C, below, the intent-centric theory of liability is
incomplete, and it is an insufficient regulatory tool in combatting openmarket manipulation.
C. The Insufficiency of Intent
The practical and conceptual difficulties inherent in open-market
manipulation make it tempting to rely on the “know it when you see
it” standard.165 In some ways, reliance on intent seems to adopt such a
measure, but this approach does not make it clear to the markets when
legitimate conduct may result in liability. Under the current approach
to open-market manipulation, intent plays an outsized role in
determining liability; this enforcement approach neither makes the
markets safer nor adequately proscribes open-market manipulation.
The exclusive reliance on intent short-circuits lawmakers’ attempts to
curb, and plaintiffs attempts to successfully prosecute, open-market
manipulation because (1) intent is both over- and underinclusive and
(2) intent does not explain how or why legitimate transactions distort
the markets.
1. Scope of intent. The scope of the intent-centric approach to
open-market manipulation is both too broad and too narrow, making
it ineffective in combatting market manipulation. It is underinclusive
because of the inherent difficulty of proving intent.166 Rarely is direct
evidence of a defendant’s manipulative intent available. In the
financial industry, it is even less likely that such proof would be
available because of the disinclination of members of highly regulated
industries to commit incriminating information to writing.167 Absent
164. Lisa M. Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of
Federal Reforms on State Director Independence Standards, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381, 383, 392
(2005) (explaining that corporate directors’ independence is important to corporate
accountability, and that shareholder derivative suits generally allege a breach of fiduciary duty).
165. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (setting the
standard for pornography as “I know it when I see it”).
166. See Huang, supra note 18, at 6 (“[T]he difficulty of proving the intent requirement is
[a] . . . main reason[] for the introduction of civil penalties to the market manipulation regime in
the 2001 [Australian securities law] reform. It had [previously] been argued . . . that intention was
too difficult to prove and this had impeded successful market manipulation prosecutions.”
(citation omitted)); cf. Loke, supra note 18, at 21 (“There is much that is problematic with Fischel
and Ross’ thesis. While there is some truth to the notion that ‘it is extremely difficult to discern
the intent of a trader with objective evidence’, objective evidence does not consist merely of the
impact of the trade.”).
167. This is not always the case. In the Amaranth case discussed supra Part II.B.4, the
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explicit or direct proof of a trader’s intent to manipulate, plaintiffs and
fact finders must infer intent from circumstantial evidence. Plaintiffs
routinely rely on trading patterns such as trade size, volume, and
timing.168 Yet, given the permissibility of traders’ actions in cases of
open-market manipulation, these factors are all subject to
interpretation.169
The evidentiary burden associated with intent is further increased
by the ability of traders to explain their legitimate transactions in a
nonmanipulative manner, particularly ex post.170 Courts are likely to
err on the side of caution when interpreting equivocal evidence of
manipulative intent in open-market manipulation cases, particularly in
the absence of market harm.171 Indeed, the intent-alone-is-enough
standard may increase the difficulty of proving open-market
manipulation, to the detriment of the wider markets. The legitimacy of
the trades, the ambiguity of the evidence of intent, and the reluctance
of the courts to base liability solely on intent all combine to decrease
the likelihood of successfully proving open-market manipulation under
this standard. Hinging the provability of manipulation solely on intent
means that most instances of manipulation will go unpunished. The
problematic nature of intent, therefore, hampers regulators’ ability to
adequately address this form of manipulation, effectively leaving
abusive market behavior unchecked.
Conversely, the intent standard is overinclusive because it
includes transactions for which the trader had a manipulative intent,
but which did not harm the market. A trader, for example, may execute
trades, hoping and wishing that they create a momentary distortion in
defendant provided emails and instant messages to the CFTC as part of the agency’s investigation.
Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 3, CFTC v. Amaranth
Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 07 Civ. 6682 (DC)), 2007 WL 4403879.
168. SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (explaining that open-market
manipulation allegations often include transactions with suspicious timing, high volume, or a
pattern of prior manipulation).
169. Indeed, what plaintiffs consider to be evidence of manipulative intent may be construed
as a defendant’s unbridled exuberance. See, e.g., Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (“It may be hard to separate a ‘manipulative’ investor from one who is simply overenthusiastic, a true believer in the object of investment.”).
170. See, e.g., Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 372–74 (involving a defendant who provided ex post
explanations for his suspicious transactions to justify them as legitimate, nonmanipulative trades).
171. See generally ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007)
(dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint that the defendants were manipulating the price of its
common stock by converting preferred stock into common stock, since the complaint’s lack of a
connection between the stock price and the defendants’ actions constituted a failure to adequately
plead the scienter requirement).
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price. Despite her intentions and her legitimate transactions, however,
suppose that she fails to manipulate the market. Per the Commissions’
approach, such conduct still constitutes market manipulation because
of the trader’s intent. Yet, in this scenario, no matter how explicit the
intent of the trader, if her trades did not harm the market, she should
not be liable for market manipulation. Admittedly, this is an extreme
example, but it demonstrates that imposing liability exclusively on the
basis of the intent of the trader can have inappropriate results that do
not improve the markets.
Furthermore, the overbroad nature of the intent standard can
have a chilling effect on beneficial market conduct. A component of
market liquidity is the existence of traders who hold different beliefs
about the price of an asset or the future trajectory of the markets.172
Traders’ ability to express their divergent opinions through their
transactions is essential to establishing an equilibrium in the markets
and fostering market liquidity, both of which contribute to market
efficiency.173 Grounding claims of manipulation solely on intent,
particularly when the proof is circumstantial, may deter traders from
engaging in beneficial market activity out of fear of liability. Traders
may exit the markets to avoid penalization for their legitimate
transactions that, ex post, may be construed as manipulative—a net
negative result for the markets.
2. Intent is not harm. The intent to manipulate is a crucial aspect
of imposing liability for open-market manipulation,174 but alone, intent
is an incomplete basis. A trader’s manipulative intent is important in
proving that her conduct was not accidental or negligent and, as such,
that the trader is blameworthy. The legitimacy of the transactions in
open-market manipulation schemes does not render the trader’s
behavior immune from liability; however, it must be demonstrated that
her conduct caused harm. Otherwise, the trader would be punished for
her bad intent alone. This defies basic criminal law theory that one is

172. See Laura E. Hughes, The Impact of Insider Trading Regulations on Stock Market
Efficiency: A Critique of the Law and Economics Debate and a Cross-Country Comparison, 23
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 479, 495 (2009) (explaining that in a liquid market, shares are bought
and sold easily, but that in an illiquid market, a seller might be unable to sell a stock since all
buyers believe that the price is unfairly low or that it would be irrational to sell the stock).
173. Global Financial Markets Liquidity Study, PWC (Aug. 2015), https://www.pwc.se/sv/pdfreports/global-financial-markets-liquidity-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9X9-46NP].
174. Multer, supra note 15, at 106 (explaining the role of intent in cases of open-market
manipulation).
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not punished merely for a criminal state of mind, but that one’s actions
must be criminal as well to warrant punishment.175 The intent to
manipulate without proof of market harm—such as injury to the
proper functioning of the markets—is an inadequate basis for liability.
An exclusive focus on manipulative intent conflates scienter with
misconduct. For some acts, bad intent transforms otherwise legitimate
conduct into criminal conduct.176 For example, if someone follows
another person innocently because they happen to be going in the same
direction, this is not a criminal act. But if someone follows another with
the intent to harm or intimidate them, this is stalking. In transforming
otherwise legal behavior into a criminal act, the intent and the effect of
the actor’s conduct are important. The same must be true for openmarket manipulation. Both the intent of the trader’s behavior and the
effect her conduct has on the market are necessary if facially legitimate
transactions are to be found manipulative. This comports with the
purpose of anti-manipulation laws—to protect the markets from
abusive behavior because it undermines the proper functioning of the
markets. A cogent theory of open-market manipulation must frame
liability in terms of the intentionality of the trader’s conduct and the
negative impact the conduct has on the market.
In sum, intent is an insufficient basis for delineating between
legitimate transactions and manipulative transactions. Intent is also an
insufficient basis for protecting the markets from open-market
manipulation. Alone, intent neither provides a coherent basis for
liability, nor effectively punishes open-market manipulation. Including
harm in the liability analysis is the most effective mechanism for
classifying a transaction as manipulative, despite its being facially
legitimate.

175. John M. Darley & Thane S. Pittman, The Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive
Justice, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 324, 325 (2003) (arguing that the defendant’s
punishment should be proportional to “the wrongness of their actions in inflicting the original
harm”).
176. See Daniel Waldman, Has the Law of Manipulation Lost Its Moorings, MONDAQ (Apr.
7, 2017, 3:50 PM), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/585174/Commodities+Derivatives
+Stock+Exchanges/Has+The+Law+Of+Manipulation+Lost+Its+Moorings [https://perma.cc/
HBQ7-YU3E] (describing intent as paramount to a manipulation charge because “absent
conduct that is fraudulent or by its very nature price-distorting, ‘it is the intent of the parties which
separates otherwise lawful business conduct from unlawful manipulative activity’” (citation
omitted)); see also Langevoort, supra note 56, at 4 (noting that while intent is a debated term,
with respect to trading, “scienter means that the insider must have deliberately taken advantage
of—that is, used—the information for personal gain,” and that the “bad act” is stripped of its
intentionality absent proof of scienter).
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III. A HARM-BASED APPROACH
In light of the feasibility of open-market manipulation and the
shortcomings of the intent-centric approach, Part III turns to the
second question this Article poses: On what basis can legitimate
transactions be considered manipulative? As alluded to above, liability
for open-market manipulation ought to require proof of the trader’s
manipulative intent and the harm her transactions imposed on the
market. Part III begins by analyzing the importance of including
market impact in analysis of open-market manipulation. This Part goes
on to analyze how open-market manipulation undermines the goals of
anti-manipulation laws and regulations by impairing market efficiency
and integrity. Part III also considers whether there is a role for market
discipline in proscribing and punishing open-market manipulation.
Finally, Part III puts forward suggestions to improve the detection and
enforcement of open-market manipulation.
A. Why Harm Matters
The Commissions, courts, and plaintiffs have struggled to identify
open-market manipulation because they fail to intellectually wrestle
with whether and how facially legitimate transactions harm the market.
Harm is a necessary component for determining whether legitimate
transactions are, in fact, illegal acts of market manipulation. By not
engaging with the question of how open-market manipulation harms
the market, lawmakers risk going beyond their stated goals, needlessly
interfering with the markets, and chilling socially beneficial conduct.
Identifying how trades harm the markets requires thinking about harm
not only in terms of affirmative conduct, but also as market impact.177
A trader who deliberately executes facially legitimate transactions that
negatively affect the markets is as responsible for her actions as
someone who issues a fraudulent statement to affect the price of an
asset. In both instances, the trader’s conduct harms the market, but
because the former uses legitimate transactions, some courts do not
impose liability. Traders ought to be held responsible for the impact of
their conduct on the markets, regardless of the methodologies they
used. This Article’s proposed harm-based analysis provides a basis for
177. Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 533, 551 (2002) (“To the extent the market price reacts to the recommendations of [rating]
analysts, the ability to engage in selective disclosures may therefore affirmatively reduce the
accuracy of stock market prices.” (citation omitted)). These inaccurate stock prices harm the
efficiency and liquidity of the market.
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alleging misconduct based on the negative impact the transactions had
on the markets.
In determining whether legitimate transactions injure the markets,
vague notions of harm do not suffice. Rather, reference must be made
to the goals of anti-manipulation laws. Specifically, to the extent that
legitimate trades impair market efficiency and market integrity and are
executed with the requisite manipulative intent, they ought to be
deemed manipulative from a legal standpoint because they are
functionally the same as traditional forms of manipulation. Failure to
punish such behavior has perverse results on the markets because it
encourages traders to aim for the same market impact but allows them
to avoid liability if their manipulative acts are legitimate transactions.
However, just as harm is necessary for liability, so is intent. Openmarket trades that harm the market despite being done without the
requisite intent ought not be punished. Negligent trading that impairs
the markets’ efficiency is not market manipulation, and failure to hold
a trader liable in such cases would likely not impede market integrity.178
A harm-based approach, which requires both manipulative intent
and market harm, treats the legitimacy of the trades for what it is—a
distraction. This approach seriously engages with the negative impact
that permissible conduct can have on the market. Including harm in the
analysis, therefore, provides a cogent framework through which one
can be held liable for open-market transactions that manipulate the
markets.
B. Identifying Harm to the Markets
Open-market manipulation harms both market efficiency and
market integrity. This Section analyzes how legitimate transactions
may nonetheless distort market prices, and it highlights specific market
conditions that may enable a trader to commit open-market
manipulation. This Section also analyzes how open-market
manipulation causes the markets to be unfair, thereby weakening
market integrity, and it discusses the contours of unjust wealth
transfers as a basis of liability.
1. Market Efficiency. The most obvious harm open-market
manipulation schemes may inflict on the markets is the impairment of
178. The markets are not risk free. Mistakes are possible; if trading that harms the market is
merely the result of a mistake or negligence, liability for market manipulation should not be
imposed.

FLETCHER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

LEGITIMATE YET MANIPULATIVE

11/26/2018 5:10 PM

521

market efficiency. Market actors expect to execute trades at prices that
are undistorted, even if not necessarily accurate, reflections of the
current economic value and future-earnings expectations of the
asset.179 Traders can use open-market transactions to weaken market
efficiency by creating an artificial price for an asset.180 The facially
legitimate nature of the transactions in open-market manipulation
seems incongruous with a claim of price distortion. This is not correct;
even with legitimate transactions, asset prices may be made artificial.
As seen in the case studies, facially legitimate trades may be used to
interfere with the markets’ pricing ability, thereby contributing to a
distorted price. To the extent that a trader’s conduct distorts market
pricing, her transactions harm market efficiency and, consequently, are
manipulative.
Key to understanding how open-market trades can create an
artificial price is disabusing oneself of the notion that price artificiality
requires illegal conduct. To equate artificiality with illegality is to
needlessly circumscribe the types of behavior that distort the market.181
There are two prevailing approaches to identifying price artificiality.
One approach views an artificial price as one that is not established by
the forces of supply and demand.182 The phrase “supply and demand”
179. SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]he purpose of securities law
[is] to ‘prevent practices that impair the function of stock markets in enabling people to buy and
sell securities at prices that reflect undistorted (though not necessarily accurate) estimates of the
underlying economic value of the securities traded.’” (citing In re Global Crossing Ltd. Sec. Litig.,
322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2004))).
180. Supra Part II.
181. Charles Mills & Karen Dildei, The Necessity of Price Artificiality in Manipulation and
Attempted Manipulation Claims, 37 FUTURE & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1, 8 (2017) (“As the CFTC
stated, ‘when a price is effected by a factor which is not legitimate, the resulting price is necessarily
artificial. Thus, the focus should not be as much on the ultimate price, as on the nature of the
factors causing them.’” (citation omitted)).
182. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Revolution in
Manipulation Law: The New CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical
Analyses, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 357, 370 (2013) (“An artificial price is one that does not ‘reflect
basic forces of supply and demand.’”(citation omitted)); Benjamin E. Kozinn, The Great Copper
Caper: Is Market Manipulation Really a Problem in the Wake of the Sumitomo Debacle?, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 243, 261 (2000) (“[A] price is artificial when it ‘does not reflect the market or
economic forces of supply and demand . . . .’” (citation omitted)); Mills & Dildei, supra note 181,
at 4 (explaining that price artificiality conveys that the market does “not reflect the legitimate
forces of supply and demand” (citation omitted)); Wendy Collins Perdue, Manipulation of
Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 370 (1987) (“Another
approach defines artificial price as a price that does not reflect the ‘basic’ or ‘legitimate’ forces of
supply and demand.” (citation omitted)); Colleen Powers, Note, Filling the Regulatory Void in the
FX Spot Market: How Traders Rigged the Biggest Market in the World, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
139, 163 (2016) (“An artificial price is one that does not ‘reflect basic forces of supply and
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refers not only to the aggregate manifestations of the market, but also
to other market factors, including general market expectations about
the price of the asset, unexpected external events such as natural
disasters or changes to government policy, and historical market
behavior, among other things.183 The second definitional approach to
price artificiality considers whether the price deviates from the
historical, expected price of the asset.184 In determining whether a price
is distorted, courts consider the dollar price, the spread between the
cash and futures markets, or the spread in the markets from one month
to the next.185
Determining whether a price is artificial requires detailed
econometric analysis that is beyond the scope of this Article.186 As such,
this Article accepts both definitions of price artificiality, since their
demand.’” (citation omitted)). This definition of price artificiality is not without its critics. See,
e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures Markets, 59
J. BUS. S103, S117 (1986) (“An effort to isolate which ‘forces of supply and demand’ are ‘basic’
and which are not is doomed to failure.”).
183. See MARK LOVEWELL, UNDERSTANDING ECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 35 (6th ed. 2012) (“The five main demand factors are the number of buyers in a
market, their average income, the prices of other products, consumer preferences, and consumer
expectations about future prices and incomes.”); id. at 40 (“The six main supply factors are the
number of producers, resource prices, the state of technology, changes in nature, the prices of
related products, and producer expectations. Once again, with each factor, we must assume that
all other factors remain constant.”); see also Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire
Squid: Regulating Securities Markets After the Financial Meltdown, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 323, 342
(2011) (noting that investors’ expectations distort trading interactions and increase risk involved
in transactions, which generally shifts the supply and demand curve).
184. Perdue, supra note 182, at 367 (“[A]n artificial price is one that is historically unusual,
either because of its absolute level or because of its relationship to other prices.”).
185. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1167–70 (8th Cir. 1971) (accepting the
Government’s three tests for establishing price distortion in the wheat futures market: (1) a record
increase in price of the future by 18.625 cents, (2) the spread between the May and July wheat
futures in 1963 experienced a record increase compared to the previous nine years, and (3) “the
May 1963 futures price was considerably out of line with the Kansas City futures price as
compared with these prior years”). From a practical and theoretical standpoint, assessing the
“normal” price is an inquiry plagued with difficulties. Indeed, because of the scope of this
question, methodology is limited (1) to those instances in which manipulation causes a change in
price that is significant enough to deviate from historical patterns, and (2) to those assets that
have a long history of being heavily traded. See David B. Kramer, The Way It Is and the Way It
Should Be: Liability Under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Thereunder for Making
False and Misleading Statements as Part of a Scheme to “Pump and Dump” a Stock, 13 U. MIAMI
BUS. L. REV. 243, 296 (2005) (“[T]hose stocks that are heavily traded . . . are less likely to be
affected by such misleading or false information. This is due to the fact that the market quickly
corrects itself due to the large number of investors and the vast amount of coverage such stocks
receive.”).
186. See Abrantes-Metz, Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 182, at 357 (proposing the use of
econometric screens to determine price artificiality).
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difference is only in mechanics, not in substance. As the case studies
above demonstrate, it is possible to create an artificial price via
legitimate transactions. The case studies also highlight factors that
oftentimes indicate that a price may be distorted instead of being the
product of the natural forces of supply and demand. The three primary
market conditions that may suggest that facially legitimate trades are
being used to distort asset prices are (1) market domination, (2) market
volatility, and (3) market illiquidity. The existence of any of these
factors, whether singularly or collectively, is not per se proof that a
price is artificial. Rather, their presence should increase scrutiny of the
legitimacy of the transactions, with the aim of determining whether the
transactions contributed to or caused a distorted price and were,
therefore, manipulative.
a. Market Domination. One indicator of whether facially
legitimate trades created an artificial price is the level of control the
trader has over the market.187 Market control occurs when a trader or
traders working together acquire a monopoly stake, or a close
approximation, in the supply or demand of physical commodities,
securities, or other financial contracts.188 The trader, then, can use her
market power to dictate the price of the asset.189 Possessing a
controlling position in an asset is not per se illegal, and indeed there
are instances in which an entity holds a natural monopoly position in a
market.190 The issue, therefore, is not merely possession of a controlling
187. See Candido, supra note 83 (“Economic theory . . . holds that purchases or sales in a free
market will in general have an impact on market price through the natural forces of supply and
demand. Thus, price influence can be anticipated from an economic standpoint.”). The Candido
piece also provides that:
a trader who holds positions in both the futures and physical markets may abstain from
trading in either or both markets to avoid being accused of trading to affect price. Or,
a trader who believes prices are low may abstain from taking advantage of this pricing
inefficiency by trying to buy as much as possible due to a fear of influencing the price.
Id.
188. AVGOULEAS, supra note 47, at 147–48.
189. Id.
190. Id.; see also Paul L. Joskow, Regulation of Natural Monopoly, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 1227, 1232 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Stevan Shavell eds., 2007) (defining a
natural monopoly as “a firm producing a single homogeneous product . . . when it is less costly to
produce any level of output of this product within a single firm than with two or more firms”).
Richard Posner also helpfully defines the natural monopoly:
If the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at lowest cost by one
firm rather than by two or more, the market is a natural monopoly, whatever the actual
number of firms in it. If such a market contains more than one firm, either the firms
will quickly shake down to one through mergers or failures, or production will continue
to consume more resources than necessary.
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position, but whether the trader used her position to dictate price—
that is, to corner or “squeeze” the market.191 A trader that acquires
market control through open-market transactions and abuses her
power to distort the market is liable for manipulation, despite the
legitimacy of the underlying transactions. Asset pricing that is the
result of a cornered market is not market driven and is, therefore,
artificial.
Taking price artificiality seriously as an avenue for liability for
open-market manipulation allows us to reframe instances of openmarket manipulation in terms of the trader’s domination of the market
and the impact that control had on the asset’s price. When considered
as such, the harm the facially legitimate transactions had on the market
is evident—the transactions were used to fix prices that did not reflect
the market-driven forces of supply and demand. The Markowski case,
discussed above, provides a salient example. The defendants controlled
the market, and using their control, they established an artificially
inflated price for the security.192 The legitimacy of the transactions, in
such cases, are red herrings that distract from the defendants’ abuse of
their market power to distort securities prices. To the extent that
traders utilize their market position to dictate asset prices, there should
be a strong inference that they have manipulated the markets.
Price distortion is possible even if the trader’s domination of the
market is short-lived. Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to
recognize market power that has not been maintained over a period of
weeks or months.193 In today’s markets, in which assets are owned for
mere seconds, market control may be established in a shorter time
Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548 (1969).
191. U.S. courts have identified four main criteria of market power manipulations: (a) the
existence of a dominant or merely controlling position in deliverable supplies; (b) the existence
of a dominant or merely controlling position in the futures market for a specific delivery period;
(c) whether these positions have been built up with manipulative intent; and (d) whether they
[have distorted] prices in both markets.” AVGOULEAS, supra note 47, at 148. Professor Lin
explains the difference between corning and squeezing:
Cornering generally occurs when one or more parties acquire the total supply of a
financial instrument or commodity and then dictate the market prices of that
instrument or commodity, thereby manipulating natural price discovery of the
marketplace . . . . Squeezing generally occurs when one or more parties acquire a
substantial supply of a financial instrument or commodity and then use their market
power to manipulate market prices in their favor.
Lin, supra note 40, at 1281–82 (citations omitted).
192. Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
193. See United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 371 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that market
domination “must be viewed in light of the time period involved and other indicia of
manipulation”).
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period.194 A trader’s controlling position in an asset that lasts for
minutes or hours may be used to distort the price in that brief window.
Indeed, given the linkage between asset closing prices and derivatives,
a savvy manipulator would not need to dominate the price for weeks
to be profitable; mere minutes would be sufficient. As with long-term
market domination, the key is to determine whether the market actor
used her controlling position in the market to improperly distort the
asset’s price.
Both Masri and Amaranth are examples of short-term market
control that contributed to or caused an artificial price in the markets.
Recall, in Masri, the defendant’s transactions constituted 94 percent of
all purchases in the asset in the last hour of trading and 75 percent of
all purchases for the day.195 Masri’s domination lasted only a single day,
but it was effective; his trades exerted pressure on the asset’s price to
his benefit, allowing him to profit on his related option contract.196
Similarly, in Amaranth, the defendants’ market control lasted mere
minutes; they sold 99 percent of the asset in the last 4 minutes of the
closing window.197 Through their brief domination of the market, the
defendants were able to distort the asset’s price, thereby manipulating
the market. Such extreme market domination, as seen in Masri and
Amaranth, calls into question whether an asset’s price is set by the
forces of supply and demand or, rather, by the trader’s controlling
market position.
Market domination, therefore, is a strong indicator of price
artificiality. To the extent that traders use open-market transactions to
establish dominance and, subsequently, distort the asset’s price, they
have harmed the market’s pricing efficiency. Market dominance, both
in the form of monopolistic ownership and relative transaction
194. See CFTC v. Parnon Energy, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 233, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that
where the defendants acquired 97 percent of the total futures contracts for West Texas
Intermediate crude oil supply from January 8, 2008, to January 27, 2008, the CFTC sufficiently
pled the “ability to influence prices” element, since the defendant maintained a dominant position
in the WTI market); SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that because
the defendant placed 7 different orders for TZA shares in the last 10 minutes of the day—
amounting to 94 percent of all TZA buy-side activity for the last hour of trading—the SEC raised
sufficient facts to plead manipulative intent).
195. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 365.
196. Id. at 364–66. Masri may be compared to corrective traders whose “only goal is to
discover manipulators and sell shares at the inflated price, thereby trying to minimize the exercise
of downward supported price pressure and maximize their profit . . . . Informed traders endeavor
to minimize the supported price pressure and maximize their profit.” Nelemans, supra note 58, at
1190–91.
197. CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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dominance, should result in courts giving those facially legitimate
transactions greater scrutiny for their potentially manipulative effect
on asset price.
b. Market Volatility. Severe price fluctuations can suggest price
artificiality.198 Generally, markets experience some level of volatility as
conditions change, market expectations are revised, and new
information becomes available.199 Abnormal price swings, however,
may indicate that the asset’s price is moving further away from its
fundamental value.200 Studies have shown that manipulated markets
exhibit higher volatility, as nonmanipulative traders try to respond to
manipulative trading.201 When traders engage in open-market
manipulation, they may increase market volatility by exerting
unsustainable pressure on the price of an asset.202 For example, asset

198. Regression models can be used to show whether price fluctuations are indicative of price
artificiality:
Generally, one should be able to examine the prices of the futures contracts at issue
through a regression model that has the market fundamental factors as regressors, that
is, right-hand-side variables. The residuals from this regression model reflect the effect
on prices of factors unrelated to supply and demand fundamentals. If prices are indeed
artificial, one will find statistically significant residuals during the alleged manipulation
period. In other words, the test for statistically significant residuals from a market
fundamental-based regression is the test for price artificiality.
Atanu Saha & Hans-Jürgen Peterson, Detecting Price Artificiality and Manipulation in Futures
Markets: An Application to Amaranth, 18 J. DERIVATIVES & HEDGE FUNDS 254, 257 (2012).
199. David C. Donald, Regulating Market Manipulation Through an Understanding of Price
Creation, 6 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 55, 64 (2011) (“Market manipulation affects the price
creation process by influencing the price to reflect not just available information about the issuer,
the relevant securities, and the market, but to a material extent the action of the manipulator. As
such, manipulation also increases volatility.”).
200. Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L.
REV. 523, 578 (2014) (“Legacy order-execution algorithms . . . often use volume as a proxy for
liquidity, and thus may trigger large price movements where it is a poor proxy. Some may be a
result of non-manipulative trading strategies whereby HFTs [high-frequency traders] chase shortterm momentum in such a way as to amplify price swings.”); X. Frank Zhang, High Frequency
Trading, Stock Volatility, and Price Discovery 8 (Dec. 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1691679 [https://perma.cc/MR33-J947] (“A large number of
unidirectional trades can create price momentum and attract other momentum traders to the
stock, a practice that amplifies price swings and thus increases price volatility.”).
201. Aggarwal & Wu, supra note 93, at 1942 (“Overall, these results suggest that prior to the
manipulation, manipulated stocks are unexceptional in terms of returns, but they tend to be more
volatile. During the manipulation period, manipulated stocks exhibit higher returns, higher
liquidity, and higher volatility.”).
202. See Nelemans, supra note 58, at 1183, 1192–93 (discussing manipulation in terms of
“unsupported price pressures” that increase market volatility and exacerbate informational
asymmetries in the market).
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prices that collapse once a trader has exited the market may signal that
the price was being artificially supported.203
Markowski, again, exemplifies this concept. Once the defendants
could no longer support the price of the security in question, the price
plummeted by 75 percent in a single day.204 The price decrease in
Mulheren was much less dramatic but was still an abnormal fluctuation
in price for the stock. Prior to the defendant’s trading, the security’s
price changed in small increments of $0.125.205 Yet, after the price
increased in response to his transactions, the defendant ceased trading,
and the stock fell by $1.375.206 In both instances, the sharp decline in
the asset prices was not accompanied by any external news or
occurrence that explained the volatility; the most significant change
was that the defendant no longer traded the asset. Such price volatility,
even when coupled with facially legitimate transactions, should be
scrutinized as an indicator of possible open-market manipulation,
particularly in the face of the double harm of market instability and the
resulting price artificiality.
c. Market Illiquidity. A final factor that may indicate that openmarket trades are being used to manipulate the market is whether the
market is small and illiquid, on the one hand, or robust and highly
liquid, on the other hand.207 A liquid, efficient market is characterized
by the ability of traders to execute orders without having the market
move against them.208 The New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and

203. The opposite is also true—that is, a price that rebounds once a trader exits may indicate
that the price was artificially depressed. However, it is more likely for manipulators to try to raise
prices than depress them. See Aggarwal & Wu, supra note 93, at 1920.
204. Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
205. United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 367–68 (2d Cir. 1991).
206. Id. (indicating that between October 16, 1985, and October 17, 1985, G&W stock moved
from $44.75 to $44.875 and then to $45 at different times of the day, but that on October 17, 1985,
G&W common stock closed at $43.625 after the defendants sold a large amount of G&W common
stock).
207. See Nelemans, supra note 58, at 1178 (“[L]arge traders in liquid markets and small
traders in illiquid markets will sometimes be able to inflate or deflate the price.”).
208. Attorney Joseph M. McLaughlin describes market illiquidity as follows:
In an efficient market, stock prices promptly and accurately reflect publicly available
information so that an investor who relies on the integrity of the market is also relying
indirectly on the information. . . . [A]n efficient market absorbs material
misrepresentations into the price of the security so quickly that the ordinary investor
cannot make trading profits on the basis of the new information. An inefficient market
does not.
JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, 1 MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.26
(14th ed. 2017) (citations omitted); see also Bratton, supra note 23, at 505 (noting that the efficient
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the NASDAQ are prime examples of efficient markets; many
securities traded on these exchanges have thousands of traders each
minute.209 Less-liquid markets include securities traded on the OTC
Bulletin Boards and the Pink Sheets, where trades may number in
single digits for a single day.210 Even in the absence of manipulation,
trades are more likely to have an effect on price in smaller markets
because there are fewer available counterparties with whom to trade.211
Trading strategies—such as placing large orders and marking the
close—have a more significant impact on asset price when the market
is illiquid.212 For a heavily traded security, moving the price would be
no small feat. For example, to move stock price of Amazon—which has
a market capitalization of over $900 billion, average daily trading
volume of approximately 3 million shares, and a per-share price of over
$2000213—through open-market trades would require, at a minimum,
the purchase of 1 percent of the company’s outstanding shares.214 On

capital market hypothesis makes a “modest prediction that prices will follow a random walk and
that no trading strategy based on public information can systematically outperform the market.”);
James Peck & Karl Shell, Liquid Markets and Competition, 2 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 362, 363
(1990) (“We say that a market is liquid if the effect of any individual’s trades on the prices in that
market is small.”).
209. See NASDAQ—Most Active Stocks, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/markets/mostactive.aspx [https://perma.cc/J329-3PJK]. For example, on September 27, 2018, one of the most
heavily traded securities on the NYSE by share volume was General Electric Company, which
had over 82 million shares traded. General Electric (GE), YAHOO! FIN.,
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/GE/history?p=GE&.tsrc=fin-srch
[https://perma.cc/YCQ3X97Q].
210. See Information for Pink Companies, OTC MKTS., https://www.otcmarkets.com/
corporate-services/information-for-pink-companies
[https://perma.cc/9XWX-98V4].
For
example, on September 27, 2018 one of the more heavily traded securities on the Pink Sheets by
share volume was Acology, Inc., which had approximately 2 million shares traded. Acology, Inc.
(ACOL), YAHOO! FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/ACOL/history?p=ACOL&.tsrc=finsrch [https://perma.cc/YA7F-YKN7] .
211. Charles R. Korsmo, Mismatch: The Misuse of Market Efficiency in Market Manipulation
Class Actions, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1111, 1147 (2011) [hereinafter Korsmo, Mismatch]
(noting that in efficient markets, there are sufficient numbers of arbitrageurs that will take the
other side of a trade, thereby making it nearly impossible for a manipulator to create an artificial
price).
212. Id. at 1145 (“Simply by placing a market purchase order, a would-be manipulator can
often increase the observed market price by the amount of the spread, which can be significant in
thinly traded stocks.”).
213. These numbers were as of August 5, 2018. Amazon.com, Inc. (AMZN), YAHOO! FIN.,
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/AMZN/ [https://perma.cc/4YBS-7V3X].
214. This l percent formulation has been adopted in the literature:
As Fischel and Ross point out, “[t]o the extent that the evidence supports the existence
of a price pressure effect, it indicates that securities have supply and demand elasticities
no smaller in magnitude than 1.” This means that a manipulator would need to buy at
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the other hand, a trader may be more effective in moving the price of
Euroseas Ltd., which has a market capitalization of approximately $14
million, an average daily trading volume of a little over 3000, and a per
share price under $2.215 Open-market manipulation schemes are likely
to be more successful in, and harmful to, illiquid assets because of the
limited volume of trading. Indeed, the manipulation schemes in
Markowski and Masri, discussed above, all occurred in smaller, illiquid
markets.
Another feature of less-liquid markets is that there is less
information available about the issuers and the value of the assets
because of lower disclosure requirements.216 The dearth of information
means that any information is likely to exert pressure on asset price.217
High-volume or higher-than-usual volume trades in small, illiquid
markets communicate information to other traders that either the highvolume trader has information about the asset or that she is attempting
to manipulate the price. Studies have shown that open-market
manipulation is more likely to be successful when other traders do not
know what motivates large orders.218 This level of information
asymmetry is characteristic of thinly capitalized markets, and the
asymmetry amplifies the impact of open-market manipulation and
increases the likelihood of price distortion. Thus, transactions utilizing
open-market manipulation strategies in highly illiquid markets warrant

least 1 percent of a company’s outstanding shares—a purchase that would be in the
billions of dollars for Microsoft—in order to raise the share price by a measly 1 percent.
Korsmo, Mismatch, supra note 211, at 1147 (citation omitted).
215. These numbers were as of August 5, 2018. Euroseas Ltd. (ESEA), YAHOO! FIN.,
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/esea?p=esea&.tsrc=fin-srch
[https://perma.cc/KKJ2-B2MH].
There is no indication that the price of Euroseas has been or is now being manipulated. The
company was chosen for illustrative purposes only.
216. SEC, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 2, 142 (July 31, 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6DQ-Y3NN]
(“Despite its size and importance, the municipal securities market has not been subject to the
same level of regulation as other sectors of the U.S. capital markets . . . . [T]he municipal securities
market is relatively illiquid and opaque, with substantially less transparency than the equities
markets, particularly on a pre-trade basis.”).
217. See MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER, ASSET PRICING UNDER ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION: BUBBLES, CRASHES, TECHNICAL ANALYSIS, AND HERDING 1 (2001) (“Financial
markets are driven by news and information . . . . This information affects traders’ expectations
about the uncertain value of an asset.”); Thompson & Sale, supra note 50, at 873 (“[M]andated
disclosures are detailed and are therefore potential sources of manipulation and fraud.”).
218. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Stock-Price Manipulation, 5 REV. FIN. STUD. 503, 509
(1992) (“[A] manipulator who is uninformed can make a profit simply by buying and selling the
stock.”).
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greater scrutiny to determine whether the trader should be held liable
for open-market manipulation.
2. Market Integrity. Most insidiously, open-market manipulation
undermines market integrity because traders use the markets’
structure and interconnectedness to effectuate their manipulative
schemes. Trading in the financial markets is a zero-sum game—each
trader’s gain comes at the cost of another’s loss.219 Market actors,
nonetheless, expect that their losses are not because their
counterparties had an unfair advantage. Traders and the public expect
that gains are fairly earned from a person’s skill, research,220 or even
luck. Public perception that the markets are fair is essential to their
proper functioning. When facially legitimate trades are used to allow a
trader to profit unfairly, this undermines the markets’ integrity,
creating the impression that the markets are rigged. Open-market
manipulation erodes public trust and confidence in the markets by
facilitating unfairness in the markets under the guise of legitimate
transactions.
But what does it mean to say that the markets ought to be fair? Or
that transactions are unfair? As a regulatory concept, fairness is hazy;
inserting it into the law of market manipulation may cause more
confusion than clarity.221 Courts, regulators, and scholars invoke
219. See JACK L. TREYNOR, Types and Motivations of Market Participants, in ASSOCIATION
MANAGEMENT & RESEARCH, EXECUTION TECHNIQUES, TRUE TRADING
COSTS, AND THE MICROSTRUCTURE OF MARKETS 35, 35 (Katrina F. Sherrerd ed., 1993)
(“[T]rading is a zero-sum game . . . . Every trade will have one winner and one loser . . . .”);
William J. Baumol, Speculation, Profitability, and Stability, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 263–64 (1957)
(“Whatever one group of traders gains another must lose . . . .”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market
Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 733 (1984)
(explaining that secondary-market trading does not create wealth because one party’s gain comes
from another’s loss); Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When Financial Markets
Work Too Well: A Cautions Case for a Securities Transactions Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 261, 272
(1989) (recognizing that trading is a zero-sum game); Whitehead, supra note 25, at 57–58
(discussing the zero-sum game that emerges when firms choose to transfer risks related to capital
raising to a transferee’s shareholders).
220. Yet still, “an informed trader generally ignores the loss to uninformed traders from [the
informed trader’s] decision to engage in information research.” Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi,
Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV. 313, 335 (2002). Further, “[t]he informed
trader compares a private benefit (the transfer of trading profits) to the private (and social) cost
of research, but ignores a host of external social costs and benefits that are likely to determine
whether the informed trading is on balance socially productive.” Id.
221. Robert W. McGee, Applying Ethics to Insider Trading, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 205, 210 (2008)
(“Trade cannot be free, it must be fair, whatever that means.” (citation omitted)); Sale &
Langevoort, supra note 21, at 777 (“Most would agree that an omission of [some] risk renders the
advice [provided by lawyers in corporate disclosures] misleading and unfair to the client.”).
FOR INVESTMENT
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fairness as a basis for prohibiting certain behavior that as a society we
deem unacceptable. For example, the grounds for punishing insider
trading, another form of market abuse, are often phrased in terms of
fairness—allowing insiders to trade on the basis of material nonpublic
information is unfair to the corporation to which the insiders owed a
duty.222 For unfairness to be a meaningful basis for evaluating harm to
the markets, the notion of fairness must be unpacked as it relates to the
financial markets.
Reliance on fairness implicates two principles that are necessary
for defining its scope as a basis of liability. On the one hand, not all
unfairness in the market can or should be grounds for liability.223 That
would make the concept of fairness overbroad, and it would contradict
the fundamental nature of the markets. On the other hand, trading with
full knowledge that one’s profits are certain cuts against the honesty
and integrity of the markets.224 Open-market manipulation,
particularly covered manipulation, brings both of these considerations
to the fore. Even in the absence of misconduct or manipulation, traders
do not have access to the same information.225 Yet, some transactions
may be unfair, such as when traders create market conditions that
guarantee their profits or unjustly make it more difficult for other
222. Early scholarship on insider trading viewed equality of information among public
investors as an underlying justification of insider-trading laws. See, e.g., EDWARD S. HERMAN,
CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 116 (1981); Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty,
Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 353, 359–60 (1988); David Ferber, The Case
Against Insider Trading: A Response to Professor Manne, 23 VAND. L. REV. 621 (1970); William
H. Painter, Rule 10b-5: The Recodification Thicket, 45 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 699, 713–14 (1971).
Similarly, lower courts also initially endorsed this view, believing that insider trading was unfair
to public investors, in general, because the latter did not have access to the same information prior
to trading. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (“[Rule 10b5] is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors
trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to information . . . .”); Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951), aff’d with modifications as to damages,
235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). The Supreme Court rejected this broad reading of Rule 10b-5 and
instead deemed trading on the basis of nonpublic information to be illegal and “unfair” only to
the extent that the trader owed a duty to the corporation whose shares were traded. It is the
violation of the duty the trader owed the corporation that makes insider trading unfair to the
corporation, rather than to the public markets as a whole. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 231–35 (1980).
223. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 (“[N]ot every instance of financial unfairness constitutes
fraudulent activity under § 10(b).”) (citation omitted).
224. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1362 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[B]etting on a ‘sure thing’
is anathema to the ideal of ‘fair and honest markets’ . . . .” (citation omitted)), rev’d on other
grounds, 445 U.S. 222.
225. BRUNNERMEIER, supra note 217, at 1 (“[I]n reality different traders hold different
information.”).
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traders to profit. Determining the point at which a transaction is not
“fair,” then, is important for identifying when open-market
transactions harm the market.
There are three possible formulations of fairness. First, fairness
may refer to traders having equal access to information. Under this
definition, it would be unfair to trade with someone who does not have
the same information. Such a definition of fairness is inappropriately
broad and limits all profitability within the markets.226 Analysts, for
example, contribute to market efficiency by researching assets and
making educated recommendations on whether to buy, sell, or hold.
The process by which this information is absorbed into the markets
facilitates asset pricing. However, if a trader had to inform her
counterparty of the results of her research before trading, there would
be no profits to be earned, nor, more importantly, would there be any
incentives to do research.227 Open-market trades, therefore, cannot be
harmful simply because a trader appropriately has more information
than her counterparty.
A second definition of fairness considers the trader’s ability to
execute transactions at the “correct” price. Thus, if open-market trades
improperly affect the asset price, the trades are unfair. Defining
unfairness in relation to the price of the asset conflates price artificiality
with harm to market integrity, which ought to be treated as separate
bases for liability. Price distortion harms market integrity, but a
definition of fairness should identify how a transaction’s unfairness can
be an independent basis of liability. Consequently, this definition is an
unsatisfactory way to frame how open-market transactions harm
market integrity.
Third, fairness may refer to the absence of unjust wealth transfers.
Although trading in financial assets is a zero-sum game, the transfer of
wealth between parties is expected to be because of the skill or luck of
the counterparty.228 Arguably, fair markets should provide a parity of
226. See Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Information-Dissemination Law: The
Regulation of How Market-Moving Information is Revealed, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1429
(2016) (discussing the view that “fairness-inspired” reforms that aim to make information
available to the public would simultaneously leave investors worse off).
227. See McGee, supra note 221, at 211 (“What is unfair is to force [individuals] to disclose
such information to people who have done nothing to earn it.”); Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of
Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 991 (2003)
(explaining that privacy permits individuals to engage in meaningful activities that have positive
value; that it encourages development; and that without this protection, individuals might not
engage in such activity).
228. See McGee, supra note 221, at 211 (arguing that some people develop more skills or are
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opportunity between counterparties in the possibility that one may lose
and the other gain. A transaction is unfair and harms the markets’
integrity if it allows one trader to place her thumb on the scale such
that the playing field is no longer level. This view of fairness rests on
the reasonable expectations of the parties that their transactions have
the same likelihood of success or failure. A trader that creates market
conditions that make her counterparties’ success less likely reduces the
public’s confidence in the fairness of the markets. This Article adopts
this third definition of fairness because it best captures how openmarket transactions can be unfair and detrimental to market integrity,
while limiting the scope of conduct that gives rise to liability for
covered manipulation schemes.
In connecting fairness with the parties’ reasonable expectations,
the scope of liability for harm to market integrity is confined to openmarket transactions in which traders have a contractual relationship.
In naked manipulation schemes, trades are between anonymous
counterparties on public exchanges. The absence of a contractual
relationship between the parties means that they have no expectations
of each other. And, there is no expectation that traders disclose their
trading strategies to their counterparties. Thus, claims for open-market
manipulation based on naked transactions should be limited to claims
based on harm to market efficiency.229 With covered manipulation, on
the other hand, the trader has a financial contract or instrument that is
directly affected by her open-market trades. While counterparties to
those trades cannot claim unfairness, the counterparties to the contract
may allege manipulation if the open-market trades were used to
undermine the reasonable expectations of the parties’ related
contractual agreement.
In covered manipulation schemes, the manipulator tilts what
ought to be a neutral contract or financial instrument into an
arrangement that benefits her by interfering with the objective
valuation methods on which the parties agreed. Specifically, in
derivatives and similar financial instruments, the payout is determined
with reference to a benchmark or other objective market measure, such
as the closing price of the asset on a specified day.230 Parties to these
naturally better at something than their competitors, and that those more-equipped people should
not be penalized by regulation that levels the playing field).
229. See infra text accompanying note 253 (explaining reasons for limiting the scope of
liability for market integrity).
230. A benchmark is a price, rate, or index that measures one or more underlying assets,
prices, or other data based on a formula, value assessment, or market survey. Fletcher,
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contracts rely on objective valuation methods to ensure that no party
has control or influence over the means of valuation.231 When a trader
interferes with the contractual basis of valuation, she diminishes the
parity of opportunity that these instruments ought to provide for each
party to the contract. Although a counterparty expects others in the
markets to act in a self-interested manner, efforts to skew the means of
valuation undercut counterparties’ reasonable expectations.232
Recall, Amaranth and its counterparties entered into a swap,
agreeing on an objective valuation method—the closing price of the
NYMEX.233 However, upon realizing that the closing price would
result in significant losses, the defendants executed transactions to
distort the closing price of the NYMEX, thereby negating the
objectivity of the agreed-on valuation measure.234 By attempting to
influence the swaps’ payout, the defendants skewed the transaction to
their benefit, contradicting the parties’ reasonable expectations. The
defendants’ gains on the swap agreements, therefore, were unfair
because they were an unjust transfer of wealth from the swap
counterparties to Amaranth. Given the unfairness of Amaranth’s
conduct toward its counterparties and the harm its trades inflicted on
market integrity, the Amaranth defendants should be liable for openmarket manipulation. Similar assertions regarding unfairness and the
reasonable expectations of counterparties can be made with respect to
Masri.
Maintaining market integrity is foundational to the markets’
efficient functioning. Yet, because of the amorphousness of the
concept of fairness in the markets, lawmakers have shied away from
using fairness as an independent basis of liability. Undeniably, openmarket manipulation implicates notions of fairness, even in instances
when pricing efficiency was not harmed, and in instances when that
harm cannot be proven. Current market structure—in which
commodities, securities, and derivatives are inextricably linked—
facilitates complex risk strategies, but this structure also makes openmarket manipulation a profitable undertaking. When traders exploit
Benchmark Regulation, supra note 97, at 1930–31.
231. Id. at 1944.
232. Patricia A. McCoy, Systemic Risk Oversight and the Shifting Balance of State and Federal
Authority over Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1389, 1414 (2015) (noting that under the DoddFrank Act, “[s]tandardized derivatives must now be cleared and executed through central
clearinghouses to improve transparency and limit counterparty risk” (citation omitted)).
233. Supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
234. Id.
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market structure and bias market outcomes in their favor, they harm
the market by robbing other market participants of an equal
opportunity to participate in a fair market.235 Even if such conduct does
not result in an artificial price, it does result in unjust wealth transfers,
which indicates that the transactions impaired market integrity and
were, therefore, manipulative.
C. A Role for Market Discipline?
Before any discussion of what regulatory intervention to identify
and punish open-market manipulation ought to look like, it is
necessary to consider whether the market can discipline the
perpetrators, given that their trades are executed on the open market.
Although regulations are important to correct market failures like
market manipulation,236 enforcement actions and private suits may not
be needed if the markets punish actors for their misconduct.
Regulatory restraint, in such cases, is more appropriate.237
In a seminal article on market manipulation, Professors Daniel R.
Fischel and David J. Ross posit that attempts to manipulate through
the open market are doomed to fail because the markets will correct
attempts to distort the price through trades.238 Fischel and Ross argue
that even if trades move an asset’s price upwards, the price will revert
to its normal value once the asset is sold on the open market.239 Naked
manipulation, they assert, is self-deterring because it cannot be
profitable, and scarce regulatory resources should, therefore, not be
directed toward it.240 In sum, their argument goes, regulation of open235. Jill E. Fisch, Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, The Logic and Limits of Event Studies
in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 553, 560 (2018) (explaining that misrepresentations
affect stock prices and result in harm to the market).
236. Rebecca Söderström, Regulating Market Manipulation: An Approach to Designing
Regulatory Principles 23 (Uppsala Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 1, 2011)
https://www.jur.uu.se/digitalAssets/585/c_585476-l_3-k_wps_2011_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ9BDXSR] (“The main justification to regulate the activity on the financial markets is to help the
financial markets perform more efficiently.”).
237. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence: Developing Strong
Securities Markets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1692 n.254 (2002) (explaining how foreign legislation
“retarded the development of the markets” when enacted in response to price-manipulation
scandals involving the German commodities markets).
238. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 18, at 518 (“[A] manipulator who is able to convince
market participants that he is informed at the time of purchase must do the opposite at the time
of sale. If he cannot, he would realize losses even if he were able to sell at the market price.”).
239. See id. at 521 (noting that a trader must hope that “prices will fall after he sells and will
not rise again simultaneously with his subsequent purchases”).
240. Id. at 518–19.
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market manipulation ought to be left to the markets, because market
forces will correct any price distortion, and because the conduct is
unprofitable, thereby making it self-deterring.241 However, neither
claim is persuasive nor correct with respect to open-market
manipulation, whether naked or covered. Thus, legal intervention is
needed.
Certainly, in some of the case studies discussed above, market
forces were able to correct for trader misconduct. In Markowski and
Amaranth, the traders’ schemes ultimately led to the demise of their
respective firms; in Mulheren, the consequences were not as grave, but
the trader still lost thousands of dollars because of the trade.242 In these
cases, it could be argued that market discipline worked well because
the traders paid a high cost for manipulating the markets. Examples of
such spectacular failures ought to serve as a deterrent for would-be
manipulators, thereby minimizing the occurrence of such schemes.
Yet, even if open-market manipulation schemes result in significant
losses for the trader, that does not mean that there is no role for
regulatory intervention. Determining whether a particular
manipulation scheme should be subject to enforcement actions
requires more than an inquiry into whether the trader profited from
her scheme.243
Even ultimately unprofitable schemes impair market efficiency
and integrity. The inability of the trader to profitably sustain her openmarket scheme does not minimize the impact that her conduct has on
the market. For example, the transactions in Markowski were selfdestructive and unprofitable; however, they still upended the market
for the securities at issue, resulting in pricing inefficiencies that
persisted for several months.244 Further, market actors other than the
defendants likely also lost when the price for the asset plummeted.
Because the scope of open-market manipulation schemes spreads
beyond the losing trader, there is still a need for regulatory
enforcement, even when the trader incurs losses. Indeed, declining to
bring enforcement suits against unprofitable manipulation schemes
may do more harm than good to the markets. Such an enforcement
strategy would signal that incurring some losses may be a way for
manipulative traders to evade prosecution, thereby weakening the

241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Supra Part II.B.
Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 529–30 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 530.
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anti-manipulation regulatory framework.
Additionally, market discipline is likely not effective in curbing
open-market manipulation when the scheme occurs in separate
markets. Recall, covered-manipulation schemes profit from movement
in one market that triggers a right in another market. As such, when
open-market trades are used to exert price pressure, thereby triggering
payments owed on a related contract, the scheme is nonetheless
profitable even after the manipulative effects of the trades have
dissipated and the asset-price returns to its nonmanipulated level. The
trader, therefore, is able to profit from the increase in price through
her contract, but is not exposed to the asset-price decrease, when and
if it occurs. The disconnect between the market that is being
manipulated and the market that is the source of the trader’s profits
means that market discipline is muted in these scenarios. Enforcement
is needed to punish and deter open-market manipulation given the
impotence of market forces.
Further, open-market manipulation can be profitable. It is not
self-deterring, and, therefore, regulatory intervention is necessary.
Covered manipulation has significant profit potential because of the
use of derivatives in these schemes. As discussed above, derivatives
allow traders to benefit from or protect themselves against the
changing price of an asset without owning the asset. These instruments
can be highly leveraged, which provides traders the opportunity to gain
high exposure to the asset’s price movement for a small cost.245 For
example, suppose a trader purchases an option that is tied to the price
of a barrel of oil, as determined by the leading oil benchmark. The
trader is entitled to payment if the benchmark settlement price of oil is
above $100 per barrel. For exposure to the price of 1000 barrels of oil,
the trader must pay five percent of the value of the contract ($5000). If
the trader is able to exert pressure on the benchmark settlement price,
causing it to settle at or above $100 per barrel, the trader earns a profit
of $95,000.246 Her profits are possible without owning a barrel of oil
and, importantly, without the need to sell oil to the market, which
would decrease her profits. The possible profits from similar openmarket schemes make them attractive for would-be manipulators.
245. Dick Bryan & Michael Rafferty, Financial Derivatives and the Theory of Money, 36
ECON. & SOC. 134, 136 (2007) (“[D]erivatives provide ‘leverage’ and reduce the costs of hedging
against unwanted price movements. As a corollary, they also cheapen the cost of speculating on
price movements.”).
246. This is the price of 1000 barrels at $100 minus the cost of the contract—that is, $100,000
- $5000 = $95,000.
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Enforcement is important, therefore, to curb the occurrence of similar
conduct in the markets.
Despite the ability of market forces to sometimes respond to
open-market manipulation, lawmakers play a vital role in ensuring the
efficiency and integrity of the markets. Even when the markets are able
to respond, regulators should still intervene to hold traders
accountable for unprofitable attempts to manipulate the markets.
Furthermore, because market discipline is unable to reach some forms
of open-market manipulation, there remains a role for regulators to
minimize the impact of open-market manipulation on the markets’
functioning.
D. Proposals for Reform
Open-market manipulation likely will remain part of the financialmarket landscape, given its profitability and the inherent difficulty of
detection. The Commissions’ recognition of open-market
manipulation and willingness to prosecute it are important and
necessary first steps. However, because of the flawed approach they
have adopted, the Commissions are ineffective at addressing openmarket manipulation. As with all forms of market manipulation, there
is no proverbial silver bullet for eliminating open-market
manipulation, but it is possible to minimize its occurrence and impact
on the markets. This Article’s proposals are aimed at assisting the
Commissions, courts, and private parties in effectively detecting and
improving enforcement outcomes against open-market manipulation,
without deterring or punishing beneficial legitimate transactions.
1. Adopt a Harm-Based Approach. The first, and most obvious,
recommendation is that the Commissions—and any relevant courts—
jettison the intent-centric approach and replace it with the framework
this Article proposes. The incomplete nature of the Commissions’
framework curtails their ability to effectively police open-market
manipulation. Embracing the harm-based approach of this Article
would provide a coherent and cogent basis on which to ground liability
for open-market manipulation. The current intent-centric theory is
only half finished. It divorces open-market manipulation from the
concept of market harm, transforming it into something akin to a
thought crime, with no evidence of illegal conduct. The Commissions,
and private parties adopting this approach, actually weaken their
claims of market manipulation. Courts are reticent to ground liability
on bad intentions in the absence of misconduct or injurious impact. The
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harm-based proposal enables plaintiffs to demonstrate that their
manipulation allegations target harmful conduct that masquerades as
legitimate transactions—not actually legitimate transactions.
Importantly, the proposed harm-based approach makes explicit
what the courts are already doing implicitly in their analysis of openmarket manipulation. Plaintiffs frame their allegations in terms of the
intent of the trader to manipulate; in response, the courts use the
language of intent to assess their claims. Yet, a closer reading of the
cases demonstrates that the court is often in search of indicia of harm,
either in the form of inefficiency or unfairness. Evidence of
manipulative intent is often used to decipher whether and how
transactions harmed the markets. In addition to being intellectually
dishonest and raising due process concerns,247 this approach ultimately
impedes effective regulation of open-market manipulation. If plaintiffs
are not required to carry their burden to establish that traders’ conduct
was harmful, then there cannot be a complete inquiry into whether the
conduct was manipulative; and defendants do not have the opportunity
to adequately defend against this implied basis for liability. Conflating
intent and harm stymies the development of legal precedent on the
question of open-market manipulation. Explicit adoption of intent and
harm as twin bases for liability would reduce much of the judicial
confusion surrounding open-market manipulation.
2. Amend the Price-Artificiality Standard. Price artificiality is an
established basis for market manipulation but is rarely raised in claims
of open-market manipulation, despite the fact that price distortion is a
noteworthy negative effect of open-market manipulation. This is
because the elements to prove price artificiality are exacting to the
point of being unattainable. Interestingly, the CFTC imposed this
standard on itself in one of its earliest market manipulation cases;248
courts have since adopted the test, which has become an albatross
around the Commissions’ necks.249 Because the test includes both a
specific intent requirement and a showing of market power, it is a
difficult one to fulfill. By requiring that defendants have the ability to
influence prices, the test focuses on the defendants that dominate or
control the market and use their market position to influence prices, as
247. Specifically, a defendant cannot adequately circumscribe her conduct ex ante if she is
unaware of the standards by which she will be judged ex post. This creates concerns regarding
enforcement of laws for which parties have no prior notice.
248. In re Cox, No. 75-16, 1987 WL 106879, at *4 (C.F.T.C. July 15, 1987).
249. See Part I.C.3 for the price artificiality test.
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is done in corners and squeezes.250 This narrows the scope of the priceartificiality test by excluding price distortion that is unconnected to
market power, though even that distortion is possible in open-market
manipulation.
The standard for price artificiality should be changed to require
general, rather than specific, intent. Additionally, if a claim of price
manipulation does not involve allegations of market-power abuse, the
plaintiff should not be required to demonstrate that the defendant
dominated the market. Making these changes to the test would expand
the applicability of price manipulation as a basis for liability,
particularly for open-manipulation schemes that do not exclusively rely
on market domination to create an artificial price. Furthermore,
changing to general intent harmonizes the price-manipulation standard
with other anti-manipulation provisions.
Price distortion is one of the primary ways in which open-market
manipulation harms the market, but the current standard does not
provide an avenue by which these allegations can be made. Continuing
to apply the current test would render price manipulation via openmarket manipulation an unprosecutable crime.251 This statement is not
hyperbolic—when the price-artificiality standard was the only basis
available to the CFTC for prosecuting market manipulation, the
Commission won only a single case in over thirty years.252 Open-market
manipulation cannot be addressed meaningfully if the Commissions
are stymied by an onerous standard. Redefining the price-artificiality
standard, therefore, is essential to holding accountable those who
engage in open-market manipulation.
3. Recognize Liability for Harming Market Integrity. Maintaining
market integrity is a well-accepted principle of financial regulation, yet
it is not recognized as an independent basis for liability. For example,
although liability for insider trading is discussed in terms of fairness,
such liability is actually based on principles of fraud. As such, while
market integrity must be maintained, liability for breaching it is based
on other grounds. Open-market manipulation undoubtedly
undermines market integrity by creating unfair market conditions that
allow manipulators to profit at the expense of other market

250. For the difference between cornering and squeezing, see text accompanying supra note
191.
251. Markham, Manipulation, supra note 93, at 283.
252. Abrantes-Metz, Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 182, at 359.
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participants. Developing a new basis for liability requires more details
than are possible in this Article, but the scope of the concept,
specifically as a private cause of action, is explored briefly herein.253
A cause of action based on market integrity would focus on the
fairness of the manipulator’s conduct vis-à-vis her counterparty. This
theory of liability would rest on holding the manipulator liable for
breaching the reasonable expectations of the counterparty at the time
of contracting. In this regard, liability for a breach of market integrity
would be framed as akin to a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in a contract. The covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is a part of every contract, and it protects the parties’
reasonable, even if unstated, expectations upon entering into the
contract.254 Interestingly, framing liability for market integrity as a
contract-like cause of action would raise the possibility that parties
might contractually waive the right to sue for open-market
manipulation, even if one attempts or is successful in price distortion.255
In such instances, harm to market integrity would not be a viable basis
for liability; however, if prices have been distorted, the Commissions

253. Whether and to what extent third parties whose transactions are affected by open-market
manipulation may bring a cause of action based on market integrity is beyond the scope of the
current discussion. This Article frames market integrity liability as unfairness which is caused by
a violation of a party’s reasonable expectations to a contract. Cf. supra Part III.B.2 (defining
market integrity in terms of counterparties’ reasonable expectations in covered transactions). In
so framing market integrity, this Article relies on privity of contract to uphold the proposed
market-integrity cause of action. But this Article recognizes that market integrity may be framed
more broadly to encompass third parties who are not in privity of contract with the manipulator.
Should one frame market integrity more broadly, it would be akin to the fraud-on-the-market
theory in which reliance of third parties may be presumed if misinformation is injected into an
efficient market. See Korsmo, Mismatch, supra note 211, at 1124–28 (discussing the theoretical
justifications underlying the fraud-on-the-market theory). If unfairness is framed as such, this
would make the market-integrity cause of action available both to third parties who were in the
market at the time of the manipulative acts and to regulators seeking to punish the conduct.
However, in the interest of space and time, this Article consciously avoids this discussion and
instead focuses on framing the proposed cause of action narrowly.
254. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 371 (1980) (explaining that “[t]he good faith performance doctrine
establishes a standard for contract interpretation and a covenant that is implied in every contract”
and that “the courts employ the good faith performance doctrine to effectuate the intentions of
parties, or to protect their reasonable expectations”).
255. Again, to draw parallels to insider trading laws, this is similar to the Supreme Court’s
assertion in United States v. O’Hagan that disclosure to one’s principal(s) of one’s intention to use
material nonpublic information for personal gain would invalidate claims of insider trading under
the misappropriation theory. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997)
(comparing the traditional or classical theory and the misappropriation theory of insider trading
liability).
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may nonetheless bring suit on the basis of harm to market efficiency.
Recognizing harm to market integrity as a private cause of action,
therefore, would not limit the ability of regulators to prosecute openmarket manipulation; rather, it would supplement the options
available to the parties that are most affected by unfair and exploitative
trades.
4. Implement Disclosure Obligations for Certain Trading
Strategies. Open-market manipulation relies heavily on specific
trading strategies that can impact and possibly distort prices.256 An
extreme—but highly effective—response to the problems these
strategies pose would be banning them entirely. Per se rules avoid
confusion and allow for ease of enforcement.257 A ban on naked short
selling and banging the close, for example, would draw a bright line and
transform these types of trades into impermissible conduct, without
regard for the intent of the trader. A blanket proscription on certain
trades would lower the costs of detecting open-market manipulation,
and enforcement would likewise be simplified. It is doubtful, however,
that such a course of action for open-market manipulation schemes
would be in the best interest of the markets and traders. The trading
strategies used in open-market manipulation can sometimes enhance
market efficiency, increase liquidity, and improve risk allocation in the
markets.258 Further, traders may use a myriad of strategies, yet to be
identified, to undermine market efficiency and integrity. Banning
trading activities that are currently known makes way for traders to
develop other strategies that may have the same effect but are excluded
from the bright-line prohibition. A complete ban on these activities,
therefore, would be a blunt response to a nuanced problem.
A more promising response would be to impose disclosure
requirements on traders who employ trading practices that may be
used in open-market manipulation schemes.259 To be effective, the
disclosure obligation should be twofold: internal, ex ante disclosures
256. Fisch, Gelbach & Klick, supra note 235, at 560–61 (“[T]he Supreme Court subsequently
noted in Halliburton II, ‘[i]n the absence of price impact, Basic’s fraud-on-the-market theory and
presumption of reliance collapse.’” (citation omitted)). Hence, in the absence of price impact, it
may be difficult to categorize trader behavior as manipulative.
257. Thel, supra note 36, at 289 (“Objective rules can interdict undesirable trades without a
costly and perhaps hopeless inquiry into the trader’s motives.”).
258. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
259. Kevin E. Davis & Anna Gelpern, Peer-to-Peer Financing for Development: Regulating
the Intermediaries, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1209, 1248 (2010) (“[T]he bulk of regulatory
emphasis in securities issuance and trading is on disclosure.”).
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and external, ex post disclosures. First, entities should develop internal
guidelines that clearly state whether and under what conditions their
traders are allowed to engage in the trading strategies in question.260
The internal guidelines should specify who may authorize use of these
trading strategies, what factors should be considered in the decision to
approve the request, the duration of the authorization, and under what
circumstances trades can be exempt, among other details. Such ex ante
rules would delineate the boundaries of acceptable conduct and
minimize the abusive use of certain trading strategies. Trading in
violation of the trader’s own internal guideline would raise red flags to
lawmakers and may serve as the basis for further inquiry into the harm
of the transactions on the markets. Consequently, preventing openmarket manipulation becomes part of an entity’s compliance
obligations and serves as a first line of defense against improper and
damaging conduct in the markets.
Second, after executing certain types of trades, traders should selfreport their activity to the Commissions. In these disclosures, traders
should reference compliance with internal guidelines. They should also
provide justifications for their trading strategies. These disclosures
would assist regulators in detecting possible open-market
manipulation and in targeting their resources to investigating whether
the transactions were harmful to the markets. Implementing ex ante,
internal guidelines and ex post trade disclosures would benefit
regulators, traders, and market participants. Through these steps,
trading transparency would be increased, improving detection of
potentially harmful transactions. The disclosure requirements would
likely deter traders from employing problematic trading strategies
without bona fide reasons, since using such strategies would expose
them to additional scrutiny from both regulators and their
counterparties.
IV. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS
This Article’s proposed approach to open-market manipulation
has several benefits for the markets and lawmakers if embraced by the
Commissions and the courts. This Part begins with a brief discussion of
these benefits. It goes on to identify drawbacks that may arise from the

260. See, e.g., Veronica Root, The Compliance Process, 94 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 18–19), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3151893 [https://perma.cc/32EG-SPAQ]
(discussing the uses of internal guidelines as a way to prevent illegal conduct within firms).
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proposed harm-based approach. This Part concludes by addressing
some unresolved questions that this Article raises.
A. Potential Benefits
This Section discusses three ways that this Article’s harm-based
approach and related proposals could improve the markets’ approach
to open-market manipulation. First, this Article’s approach would
reduce the costs of trades. Second, it would increase market certainty
of the contours of liability for open-market manipulation, while
providing regulators with flexibility in enforcement. Third, it would
involve private parties in their own regulation, thereby increasing the
likelihood of success.
1. Reduced Transaction Costs. An ineffective enforcement
strategy against market manipulation has many of the same
consequences as an absence of anti-manipulation laws. Markets in
which manipulation goes unaddressed have higher transaction costs
because market actors must account for possible manipulation in their
pricing.261 Market participants who fear that their counterparties may
exploit the markets to unfairly profit may refuse to enter into these
transactions or only do so at a higher cost. Increased transaction costs
result in fewer transactions being executed and a reduction in market
liquidity overall.262 Similarly, the breadth of the Commissions’ intentcentric approach may have discouraged some from engaging in
beneficial transactions for fear of liability, thereby further reducing
market liquidity and increasing transaction costs.
This Article’s approach would be more effective in identifying
open-market manipulation and separating it from legitimate
transactions, using as a basis the harm the transactions inflict on the
markets or counterparties. With the harm-based approach, the markets
would be assured that the government is more effective in its efforts to
detect, minimize the occurrence of, and punish the perpetrators of
open-market manipulation. A more robust and theoretically sound
approach would ensure that only those transactions that disrupt the
markets would be punished. The direct result of this approach would
261. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 716 (“Restrictions on fraud and manipulation
simultaneously lower information traders’ cost of verifying the credibility of information and
improve their ability to make accurate predictions.”).
262. Yakov Amihud, Haim Mendelson & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Liquidity and Asset Prices, 1
FOUND. & TRENDS IN FIN. 269, 270 (2005) (explaining that exogenous transaction costs reduce
the number of agents in the market, reducing market liquidity).
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be that traders would be likely to trust the pricing efficiency of the
markets and would trade freely with their counterparties. This would
result in reduced transaction costs, greater market liquidity, and
enhanced market efficiency. Thus, this Article’s approach would
reduce transaction costs by improving the efficacy of private and
government actions against open-market manipulation.
2. Market Certainty and Regulatory Flexibility. This Article’s
approach eliminates much of the confusion that surrounds the law of
open-market manipulation. As discussed above, the current confusion
in the law stems primarily from the use of intent as the sole basis for
liability. Market actors are uncertain whether their conduct may be
deemed manipulative based on the Commissions’ indeterminate
inference of manipulative intent. The harm-based approach proposed
herein moves away from the ambiguous intent standard and clearly
specifies grounds on which facially legitimate transactions may be
assessed as manipulative. By grounding liability on the effect of the
trader’s conduct on the market, this Article’s approach bases liability
on the combination of intent and harmful conduct. This would clarify
for traders when their conduct may be considered manipulative,
thereby allowing them to tailor their transactions to avoid allegations
of manipulation.
The harm-based approach would grant needed flexibility to
regulators in combatting open-market manipulation. The approach
does not limit open-market manipulation to specific trading strategies
or conduct. Rather it accepts that the mechanisms by which traders
may manipulate the markets are limitless. Lawmakers need access to
wide-ranging theoretical and practical tools to effectively address
open-market manipulation. The harm-based approach provides just
that. Allowing allegations of open-market manipulation to be based on
the market damage caused by trades enables lawmakers to address
market activity that undermines the markets’ functioning. This
approach keeps the Commissions in alignment with their regulatory
goals by providing them with the ability to enforce the antimanipulation laws, while preserving meaningful limitations on the
scope of the Commissions’ authority.
It is likely that the harm-based approach would also improve the
Commissions’ track record of enforcing open-market manipulation in
the courts. As seen in the case studies in Part II.B, the courts often view
allegations of open-market manipulation skeptically because of the
singular focus on the trader’s intent. The inclusion of harm in the legal
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theory of liability would likely allay courts’ skepticism of open-market
manipulation because this theory explains why seemingly legitimate
transactions are nonetheless manipulative. The law of open-market
manipulation, as a result, would be more consistent. With a firm
foundation for liability, lawmakers would be better able to articulate
and analyze the factors that are necessary to prove market harm. Thus,
open-market manipulation law would develop coherently and enhance
market participants’ confidence in the law’s capabilities.
3. Private-Party Engagement. This Article’s approach engages
market participants in all stages of the regulatory oversight of openmarket manipulation—deterrence, detection, and enforcement. First,
this Article’s proposed internal-guidelines requirement is a form of
self-regulation that asks traders and market participants to establish
the rules by which they will utilize certain trading strategies. Selfregulation is a useful tool that straddles the middle ground between
top-down government regulation and the absence of regulation; selfregulation is particularly beneficial in complex systems like the
financial markets.263 Additionally, involving market participants in
their own regulation minimizes resistance and fosters greater
adherence to self-imposed rules.264 By establishing internal guidelines
as a prerequisite for engaging in certain types of trades, this Article’s
proposal enables traders to be part of the regulatory process.
Importantly, the internal rules companies develop to guide their
traders would be better tailored to the individual needs of each entity
than any generally applicable prohibitions the Commissions could
draft. This Article’s proposal, therefore, is a nuanced approach to
trading strategies that are both problematic and beneficial; it would
grant private parties the flexibility to decide whether and under what
circumstances they will utilize certain trading strategies. Indeed, a
company may determine that the scrutiny that would result from
employing these suspicious trading practices is not worth the cost and
choose to prohibit them altogether. As a result, there may be fewer
instances of these disruptive trades as traders decide to forego them.265
Second, through ex post disclosures, market actors would assist
regulators in identifying manipulative conduct. Market manipulation is
263. See Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, supra note 97, at 1967–69 (discussing the benefits
of self-regulation).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1968 (“Self-regulation may, therefore, go beyond legal standards and impose
higher ethical standards that benefit the entire industry.” (citation omitted)).
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notoriously difficult to detect, and open-market manipulation, based
on facially legitimate trades, is even more so. Having disclosure
requirements in place would help lawmakers identify harmful conduct
in two separate but related ways. Most obviously, trading disclosures
would limit the data the Commissions must review de novo to
distinguish legitimate trades from manipulative ones. These disclosures
would be a useful mechanism, bringing attention to potentially
disruptive trades that may only have a veneer of legitimacy, thereby
enabling the Commissions to address open-market manipulation
promptly. Less obviously, the process of identifying potentially
harmful transactions would be advantageous to lawmakers because it
would force them to consider which trading practices are harmful and
why. In developing disclosure guidelines, the Commissions would be
required to do their own internal analysis of trading patterns that they
believe are disruptive and signal to the markets that these trades will
be met with additional scrutiny. This process of engaging with the
markets would likely endow the Commissions with a greater
understanding of certain trading strategies and with an awareness of
other strategies, not on the Commissions’ radar, that market
participants find problematic.
Third and lastly, this Article’s approach would engage market
participants as private-party enforcers of anti-manipulation laws,
thereby improving the likelihood that open-market manipulation will
be punished. Anti-manipulation laws currently allow private parties to
bring claims of market manipulation under both the Exchange Act and
the CEA. Generally, the availability of private causes of action both
increases compliance with the regulatory framework because of fear of
private lawsuits and decreases government costs because private
litigants shoulder some of the costs of enforcement.266 Private-party
suits are an important tool in enforcing market discipline because they
allow aggrieved counterparties to vindicate their rights without
awaiting government intervention.267 This Article’s proposal
supplements the currently existing private rights of action, most
notably by expanding the grounds available for private claims. To the
266. Meric Sar, A Regulatory Retreat: Energy Market Exemption from Private AntiManipulation Actions Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 605,
635 (2017) (“[T]he most important benefits of the supplemental private right of action approach
are (i) greater compliance with . . . norms due to greater deterrence caused by the potential of
private lawsuits, and (ii) lower costs for the agency due to the allocation of litigation costs between
private claimants and the . . . agency.”).
267. Id.
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extent that traders are able to defend themselves against market
manipulation, they are more likely to participate in the markets.
Private causes of action also ensure that recourse is available even in
instances of open-market manipulation that are too insignificant to
warrant the full-scale efforts of agency litigation. Furthermore,
recognizing harm to market integrity as an independent cause of action
would free private plaintiffs from the strictures of proving price
manipulation, as long as they are able to demonstrate that transactions
were manipulative due to their unfairness.
B. Drawbacks
Despite the benefits of this Article’s proposal, there are potential
drawbacks to the adoption of a harm-based approach. This Section
addresses four objections. First, is exclusive reliance on ex post
enforcement effective in preventing open-market manipulation?
Second, does the proposal increase the difficulty of proving openmarket manipulation? Third, is the proposal’s reliance on selfregulation flawed? Fourth, will recognition of market integrity as a
basis for liability increase litigation in a way that proves costly and
ineffective?
1. Ex Post Regulation. This Article proposes identifying openmarket manipulation by assessing whether the trader’s conduct
harmed market efficiency, market integrity, or both. The proposed
regulation of open-market manipulation, therefore, is primarily
backward-looking, thereby requiring that harm occur before liability
attaches. There are drawbacks to regulating ex post, but in the case of
open-market manipulation, ex post regulation is the best course of
action.
Financial regulation is rarely exclusively prescriptive or reactive;
it is usually a mix of both because prescriptive regulation requires that
enforcement be upheld, and reactive regulation requires, at a
minimum, that broad-based rules alert the markets of potential
liability. Nonetheless, one may classify regulatory frameworks as
primarily ex ante and prescriptive or ex post and reactive, depending
on the focus of regulations. Ex post regulations attempt to mitigate
harm that has already occurred, rather than preventing the harm from
occurring in the first place.268 In the financial markets, relying primarily
268. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the
Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 92–93 (2013) (explaining that the goal of ex
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on ex post regulations may have significant negative repercussions on
the markets, particularly if manipulative conduct is not discovered,
halted, and punished promptly.
Determining the optimal timing and focus of regulations is a
complex task, but it turns on analysis of three essential considerations:
information availability, effectiveness of sanctions, and administrative
costs.269 First, with respect to information availability, if regulators have
limited information about the conduct they are regulating or deterring,
then legal intervention should be ex post. Regulators need information
about the nature of the misconduct, the magnitude of the harm, the
identity of the perpetrator, or some combination thereof in order to
effectively regulate conduct ex ante.270 In the absence of such
information, it is better to allow markets to operate freely and to allow
regulatory intervention only once more accurate information is
available. Second, the timing of regulation depends on the
effectiveness of sanctions in deterring undesirable conduct.271
Sanctions are efficacious in discouraging misconduct when they can
approximate the type and scope of harm that results from the
misconduct.272 As such, sanctions should be ex ante if they can target
the harm and its expected magnitude before the conduct has occurred.
On the other hand, regulation should be ex post if the misconduct and
its magnitude are best evaluated afterward. Third, the administrative
costs of regulatory intervention must be considered. Ex ante regulation
is preferred if the costs of monitoring and policing are less than the
costs of investigating and litigating misconduct.273
Because of the sensitivity of the markets to destabilizing shocks
that have wide-reaching effects throughout the economy, it may be

ante regulations is the prevention of negative financial shocks, and that ex post laws aim to
mitigate the harm of financial shocks once they have occurred); Donald C. Langevoort, Managing
the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection: The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48
VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1154 (2003) (“Expressing the duty [to disclose] simply anticipates that
investors are often misled by the nondisclosure and suffer considerable harm. Thus [the duty to
disclose] should be explicitly within the purview of the federal securities laws.”).
269. See supra Part I (discussing existing regulations).
270. See Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, supra note 97, at 1938 (discussing the type and form
of information needed to effectively craft ex ante regulations); see also STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 572–75 (2004) (advising that the fundamental
dimensions of legal intervention fall under three categories: timing, form, and the private or public
nature of the enforcement).
271. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, supra note 97, at 1938.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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problematic to focus regulation on addressing impediments to market
efficiency and integrity after harm has occurred. These concerns are
valid, and considerations regarding the timing of financial regulation
ought not be ignored; however, in the context of open-market
manipulation, regulation will be most effective if implemented ex post.
Importantly, while open-market manipulation can and does harm
the markets, the effects of these manipulative schemes are likely to be
contained. Both naked and covered manipulation typically target a
single asset, which makes systemic market destabilization unlikely.
Neither form of open-market manipulation is prolonged in its duration,
as manipulators typically focus their efforts in time periods as short as
minutes. Covered manipulation directed at distorting a benchmark
may be one of the most impactful open-manipulation schemes;
however, even then, such schemes target a single benchmark on a
specific day.274 Therefore, the likelihood that open-market
manipulation will be a source of systemic risk is quite low.275
Furthermore, based on the factors for determining the timing of
legal intervention, open-market manipulation falls squarely in the ex
post category. The importance of market harm to the identification of
open-market manipulation means that regulators do not have
sufficient information before the trades are executed and the impact of
the transactions on the markets is analyzed. Sanctions put in place to
deter open-market manipulation, therefore, would have little or no
impact because it is almost impossible to anticipate the scope and
nature of the harm that will result from an open-market manipulation
scheme. Also, the administrative costs of monitoring and policing for
open-market manipulation likely outweigh those for investigating and
litigating because open-market manipulation involves legitimate trades
that are difficult to detect. Lastly, it is important to note that although
this Article’s proposal is primarily focused on ex post remediation, it
has some prescriptive aspects aimed at easing the detection and

274. This is unlike benchmark manipulation, in which traders manipulate benchmarks for
years by distorting the inputs over which they have control. Benchmark manipulation may be
accomplished through trades, but it is more effective when the traders have control of the
calculation of the benchmark and distort it from within. See generally id. (discussing benchmark
manipulation).
275. John C. Coffee, Jr., Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital to Mitigate
Systemic Risk 1 (Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 380, 2010) (noting that
systemic risk describes the “localized economic shock [that has] worldwide repercussions because
of the interconnections between financial institutions.” (citing Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk,
97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008))).
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deterrence of open-market manipulation.276 This Article’s proposal
recognizes the importance of establishing mechanisms preemptively to
facilitate better ex post enforcement. In this way, it would minimize the
likelihood that open-market manipulation would go unchecked for an
extended period, wreaking havoc on the markets, because of a merely
reactive framework.
2. Difficulty of Proving Harm. The harm-based framework this
Article proposes requires that plaintiffs demonstrate both
manipulative intent and harm to the markets. This approach increases
the evidentiary burden on the government and private parties, which
may make it more difficult to allege open-market manipulation.
Additionally, this Article’s proposal incorporates price manipulation—
a notoriously difficult standard—as one of the means by which
plaintiffs can demonstrate market harm. Thus, a legitimate question
exists as to whether the proposed harm-based approach improves
enforcement against open-market manipulation.
This Article’s proposal brings open-market manipulation in line
with other conduct and activity that is deemed manipulative.
Definitions of market manipulation include both intent and harm,
whether the allegations are based on fraud, misrepresentation, or
fictional trading. The Commissions’ current approach to open-market
manipulation dispenses with harm and focuses solely on the intent of
the trader. Thus, this Article’s approach merely corrects the anomalous
treatment of open-market manipulation and harmonizes it with other
forms of market manipulation. Additionally, there should be little
concern over the harm-based approach placing a heavier burden on the
government. Claims of open-market manipulation rest on allegations
that legitimate transactions should be the basis of liability. If the
government wants to hold someone liable for legitimate transactions,
it ought to be required to meet a higher burden than one fulfilled by
circumstantial evidence of intent alone.
Further, it is important to note that the Commissions and private
plaintiffs have not been particularly successful in their enforcement of
open-market manipulation on the basis of intent alone. As discussed
previously, courts have been skeptical of allegations for manipulation
based on intent alone. As a result, some courts have either refused to
find liability without a showing of “something more”277 or held
276. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the benefits of this Article’s proposal).
277. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 2007) (“To be
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defendants liable only if their trades entirely lacked an investment
basis.278 The harm-based approach would allay the courts’ concerns and
provide the Commissions with a way to respond to courts’ underlying
inquiry: Why are these facially legitimate trades manipulative? Thus, this
Article’s proposed approach responds to courts’ skepticism by showing
how legitimate trades can be used to manipulate the markets via the
resulting market injury. Harm offers the Commissions and the courts
an objective and verifiable way to identify open-market manipulation
that is less circumstantial than the previous intent-centric approach.
3. Self-Regulation. This Article’s proposal relies on entities and
traders adopting and enforcing internal guidelines for potentially
manipulative trading strategies. Traders would also be expected to selfreport conduct that may subject them to enhanced scrutiny and,
possibly, to enforcement actions. Including self-regulation as a key
component of this Article’s proposed framework raises important
questions and concerns.
Self-regulation requires the government to trust market actors to
participate in their regulation. Critics of self-regulation posit that
“private profit-seeking enterprises cannot be trusted to regulate their
own activities in a manner conducive to promotion of publicly
desirable goals.”279 This observation is all the more poignant given that
traders would be expected to self-report conduct that may result in
their own liability.
These concerns with respect to self-regulation should not be
ignored, but they are not as significant within the context of this
Article’s proposal. This Article’s proposal does not rest on selfregulation operating in a vacuum. Rather, self-regulation would be one
of the tools available to regulators in detecting open-market
manipulation. The government should also coordinate with exchange
operators to detect trading activities that may have been unreported
and to verify reports that have been made. Even in the absence of
compliance and disclosure requirements, the Commissions are able to
identify some instances of open-market manipulation. The inclusion of
traders in their own regulation would only enhance the effectiveness of
the process.
actionable as a manipulative act, short selling must be willfully combined with something more to
create a false impression of how market participants value a security.”).
278. See supra Part II.B (discussing SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
279. Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, 35
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665, 674 (2010).
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4. Increased Litigation. Lastly, one may also be concerned that this
Article’s advocacy for market integrity as an additional basis of liability
would increase litigation for heretofore acceptable conduct. While this
may occur, it is more likely that in the absence of a private cause of
action for unfair market behavior, unlawful conduct escapes liability,
to the detriment of market integrity and efficiency. The cost of
increased litigation is less important when weighed against the benefit
to the markets from allowing market actors to vindicate their rights.
This is particularly true considering the possibility that market
participants may still utilize contractual provisions to waive or enforce
their right to engage in otherwise unfair market conduct. Therefore,
any increase in private litigation may, in fact, increase market integrity
and efficiency, and to the extent that traders want to avoid being held
liable for unfairness, they may contractually opt out of that liability, as
long as their counterparties agree.
CONCLUSION
Imposing liability for legitimate transactions raises knotty but
important questions. The intent of the actor, however, is not a legally
adequate or sound basis on which to ground liability. Within the
current approach—one espoused by the Commissions, private
plaintiffs, and some courts—intent plays an outsized role that does not
increase market safety because it fails to accurately target open-market
transactions that undermine the markets. This Article’s proposal
addresses this glaring shortcoming.
This Article’s approach to open-market manipulation employs
intent to ensure that traders are not liable for negligent or accidental
trades that cause harm. This approach also includes harm in the
analysis of open-market manipulation, adding needed clarity to this
corner of the market. A harm-based analysis provides a coherent way
to distinguish between legitimate transactions and manipulative
conduct. This approach would assure market actors that their intent
alone will not make them liable for manipulation, and it would
appropriately target those transactions that impair the functioning of
the market. Furthermore, by considering market harm in terms of
market efficiency and integrity, this Article acknowledges a form of
market injury that is more amorphous—unfairness—but nonetheless
detrimental to the markets. The Commissions and the courts must
amend their approach to open-market manipulation. Adopting a
harm-based approach would provide a more complete basis on which
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to address this form of market manipulation, and it would ultimately
improve the markets’ efficiency and enhance public trust and
confidence in the markets.

